p-Dominance and Belief Potential
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper elucidates the logic behind recent papers which show that a unique equilibrium is selected in the presence of higher order uncertainty, i.e., when players lack common knowledge.We introduce two new concepts: belief potential of the information system and p-dominance of Nash-equilibria of the game, and show that a Nash-equilibrium is uniquely selected whenever its p-dominance is below the belief potential.This criterion applies to many-action games, not merely 2 x 2 games.It also applies to games without dominant strategies, where the set of equilibria is shown to be smaller and simpler than might be initially conjectured.Finally, the new concepts help understand the circumstances under which the set of equilibria varies with the amount of common knowledge among players.
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Citations
Cites
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Cited by
Global Games: Theory and Applications
Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2010) · Advances in Economics and Econometrics · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511610240.004 · Cited by 926
Self-citationBasins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
Ellison, G. (2000) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00119 · Cited by 406
Communication and Coordination in Social Networks
Chwe, M. S.-Y. (2000) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00118 · Cited by 373
Metadata
- Authors
- Morris, S., Rob, R., & Shin, H. S.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1995-01
- Volume
- 63
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 145
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2244924016
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 11.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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