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Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test

Epstein, David, O'Halloran, Sharyn · 1996 · The Journal of Politics

Abstract

Despite the abundance of recent studies on divided government, no clear consensus has emerged as to whether divided partisan control has an appreciable impact on policy outcomes. In this article we take a new perspective on the divided government debate by emphasizing the important role that the federal bureaucracy plays in shaping policy. We present a game theoretic model of the policy-making process in which legislators design administrative procedures, the president appoints agency heads, and bureaucrats collect information and promulgate regulations. The model predicts that during times of divided control Congress delegates less discretionary authority to the executive branch, and that these changes in authority have significant policy consequences. We then test the implications of our model with data drawn from U.S. trade policy between 1890 and 1990. Our central finding is that divided government influences policy indirectly, through the procedures that Congress designs to control the bureaucracy.

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Metadata

Authors
Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S.
Venue
The Journal of Politics
Published
1996-05
Volume
58
Issue
2
Pages
373-397
ISSN
  • 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-2508
OpenAlex
W2123858578
Cited by
209
References
0
FWCI
9.47
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2960231
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Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S. (1996). Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and Empirical Test. The Journal of Politics. https://doi.org/10.2307/2960231

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.