The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The "Ratchet Principle" and Performance Incentives
Open accessAbstract
The use of current performance as a partial basis for setting future targets is an almost universal feature of economic planning. This "ratchet principle, " as it is sometimes called, creates a dynamic incentive problem for the enterprise. Higher rewards from better current performance must be weighed against the future assignment of more ambitious targets. In this paper I formulate the problem of the enterprise as a multiperiod stochastic optimization model incorporating an explicit feedback mechanism for target setting. I show that an optimal solution is easily characterized, and that the incentive effects of the ratchet principle can be fully analyzed in simple economic terms.
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Citations
Cites
The New Soviet Incentive Model
Weitzman, M. L. (1976) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003200 · Cited by 275
Self-citationThe Economics of Soviet Planning
Rimlinger, G. V., & Bergson, A. (1966) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055997 · Cited by 115
Cited by
The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism
Kornai, J. (1992) · doi:10.1093/0198287763.001.0001 · Cited by 1,429
Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style
Jin, H., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.11.008 · Cited by 1,172
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
Sappington, D. E. M. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.2.45 · Cited by 838
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint
Kornai, J., Maskin, E. S., & Roland, G. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205103771799999 · Cited by 749
Lazear, E. P. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296345 · Cited by 708
Metadata
- Authors
- Weitzman, M. L.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1980
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 302
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1564422535
- Cited by
- 455
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 8.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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