The DOI matches its Crossref record.
On Liability and Insurance
Abstract
The question considered in this article is how liability rules and insurance affect incentives to reduce accident risks and the allocation of such risks. This question is examined when liability is strict or based on the negligence rule; and, if first-party and liability insurance are available, when insurers have information about insured parties' behavior and when they do not have such information. The conclusions are in essence that although both of the forms of liability create incentives to take care, they differ in respect to the allocation of risk; that, of course, the presence of insurance markets mitigates this difference and alters incentives to take care; and that despite the latter effect, the sale of insurance is socially desirable.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.1.45 · Cited by 1,159
Self-citationShavell, S. (1986) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/0144-8188(86)90038-4 · Cited by 495
Self-citationRegulating ChatGPT and other Large Generative AI Models
Hacker, P., Engel, A., & Mauer, M. (2023) · 2023 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3593013.3594067 · Cited by 466
“Beyond this point, only the users should be the subject of regulation and civil liability (and vice versa, for example in control-via-API cases): incentives for action only make sense where the person incentivized is actually in a position to act [89, 90].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Shavell, S.
- Venue
- The Bell Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1982
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 120
- ISSN
- 0361-915X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1512657555
- Cited by
- 251
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On Liability and Insurance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3003434
- The paper
- Shavell, S. (1982). On Liability and Insurance. The Bell Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003434
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.