The DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 59 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence
Abstract
This article reports on the first quantitative perceptual deterrence study of corporate (rather than individual) deterrence. The study is based on interviews with 410 chief executives of small organizations and their officially recorded compliance with regulatory standards. We find partial support for the certainty of detection as a predictor of both self-reported and officially recorded compliance but no support for the certainty or severity of sanctioning. The narrow range of sanctions available in the particular regulatory domain studied (regulation of nursing home quality) has enabled a fuller specification than was possible in previous studies of an expected utility model for all available sanctions. Managers' expected corporate disutility from all sanctions fails to explain compliance. Deterrence does not work significantly more effectively for chief executives (a) of for-profit versus nonprofit organizations, (b) who are owners compared with those who are not owners, (c) who say they think about sanctions more (sanction salience), (d) who may better fit the rational choice model in that they are low on emotionality, (e) who have a weaker belief in the law. Nor is deterrence more effective when compliance costs are low.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (1983) · Cited by 79,866
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Decision, Probability and Utility · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,474
(1990) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.27-6637 · Cited by 16,594
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Gamst, F. C. (1991) · Anthropology of Work Review · doi:10.1525/awr.1991.12.3.19 · Cited by 7,932
Crime, Shame and Reintegration
Braithwaite, J. (1989) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804618 · Cited by 4,153
Self-citationStatistical Methods for Social Scientists
(1977) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2009-0-22083-6 · Cited by 1,880
The moral dimension: toward a new economics
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-3358 · Cited by 1,531
Social Learning and Deviant Behavior: A Specific Test of a General Theory
Akers, R. L., Krohn, M. D., Lanza-Kaduce, L., & Radosevich, M. (1995) · Contemporary Masters in Criminology · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-9829-6_12 · Cited by 1,198
Cited by
The Legal Environments of Organizations
Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. C. (1997) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.479 · Cited by 730
Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations
Winter, S. C., & May, P. J. (2001) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.1002/pam.1023 · Cited by 575
Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment
Short, J. L., & Toffel, M. W. (2010) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2189/asqu.2010.55.3.361 · Cited by 413
Rational Choice, Situated Action, and the Social Control of Organizations
Vaughan, D. (1998) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/827748 · Cited by 266
The Dialectics of Corporate Deterrence
MAKKAI, T., & BRAITHWAITE, J. (1994) · Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency · doi:10.1177/0022427894031004001 · Cited by 125
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Braithwaite, J., & Makkai, T.
- Venue
- Law & Society Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 7-40
- ISSN
- 0023-9216 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5893
- OpenAlex
- W2312200186
- Cited by
- 278
- References
- 59
- FWCI
- 27.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3053888
- The paper
- Braithwaite, J., & Makkai, T. (1991). Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence. Law & Society Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/3053888
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.