Learning from Complexity: Effects of Prior Accidents and Incidents on Airlines' Learning
Open accessAbstract
Using data on accidents and incidents experienced by U.S. commercial airlines from 1983 to 1997, we investigated variation in firm learning by examining whether firms learn more from errors with heterogeneous or homogeneous causes. We measured learning by a reduction in airline accident and incident rates, while controlling for other factors related to accidents and incidents. Our results show that heterogeneity is generally better for learning, as prior heterogeneity in the causes of errors decreases subsequent accident rates, producing a deeper, broader search for causality than simple explanations like “blame the pilot.” The benefits of heterogeneity, however, apply mainly to specialist airlines. Generalist airlines learn, instead, from outside factors such as the experience of others and general improvements in technology. These results suggest a theory of learning across organizational forms: complex forms benefit from simple information, and simple forms benefit from complex information. The implications of our study for learning theories and work on organizational errors are discussed.
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Creating diversity in perspectives can force organizations to avoid simple interpretations through constructive conflict and deeper discussions about actions to take.
“Creating diversity in perspectives can force organizations to avoid simple interpretations through constructive conflict and deeper discussions about actions to take (Haunschild and Sullivan 2002;Gressga ˚rd and Hansen 2015).”
From Organizational resilience: a capability-based conceptualization (2020) · cites this paper as Haunschild and Sullivan 2002
Organizations often generate new knowledge (lessons learned), but fail to translate this knowledge into new behaviors.
“As a result, organizations often generate new knowledge (lessons learned), but fail to translate this knowledge into new behaviors.”
From Organizational resilience: a capability-based conceptualization (2020) · cites this paper as Haunschild and Sullivan 2002
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Organizational resilience: a capability-based conceptualization
Duchek, S. (2020) · Business Research · doi:10.1007/s40685-019-0085-7 · Cited by 2,027 · see citing works
<i>A Behavioral Theory of the Firm</i>—40 Years and Counting: Introduction and Impact
Argote, L., & Greve, H. R. (2007) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1070.0280 · Cited by 606 · see citing works
Practice makes perfect: entrepreneurial-experience curves and venture performance
Toft-Kehler, R., Wennberg, K., & Kim, P. H. (2014) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.07.001 · Cited by 216 · see citing works
Desai, V. M. (2020) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.2019.1292 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
- Authors
- Haunschild, P. R., & Sullivan, B. N.
- Affiliations
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
- Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HK)
- ORCID
- Sullivan, Bilian Ni
- Venue
- Administrative Science Quarterly
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2002-12
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 609-643
- ISSN
- 0001-8392 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3815
- OpenAlex
- W1993683984
- Cited by
- 494
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 28 · 2018: 31 · 2017: 26 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 24 · 2013: 30 · 2012: 38
- FWCI
- 12.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Administrative Science Quarterly (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Texas ScholarWorks (Texas Digital Library) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Health Professions › Radiological and Ultrasound Technology › Occupational Health and Safety Research
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management › Organizational Learning and Leadership
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Innovation and Knowledge Management
- Keywords
- organizational learning, airline accidents, aviation incidents, accident causes, error causes, organizational complexity, organizational forms, commercial aviation safety
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