The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach
Abstract
The relation between IMF conditionality and country ownership of assistance programs is considered from a political economy perspective, focusing on the question of why conditionality is needed if it is in a country's best interests to undertake the reform program. It is argued that heterogeneity of interests must form the basis of any discussion of conditionality and ownership. The paper stresses a conflict between a reformist government and domestic interest groups that oppose reform, leading to a distinction between government and country ownership of a program. After discussing conceptual issues, I present a model of lending and policy reform that illustrates the effects of unconditional and conditional assistance first without and then with political constraints. It is shown that conditionality can play a key role even when the IMF and authorities agree on the goals of an assistance program.
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Cites
Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003457 · Cited by 4,903
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Dixit, A. (2002) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/3069614 · Cited by 1,104
When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter?: Two-Level Games with Uncertainty
Iida, K. (1993) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002793037003001 · Cited by 232
Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games
Mo, J. (1995) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082517 · Cited by 186
The IMF: Lender of Last Resort or Scapegoat?
Vreeland, J. R. (1999) · Cited by 83
Cited by
The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?
Dobbin, F., Simmons, B., & Garrett, G. (2007) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.090106.142507 · Cited by 1,379
Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism
Simmons, B. A., Dobbin, F., & Garrett, G. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060267 · Cited by 1,095
The Scope of IMF Conditionality
Stone, R. W. (2008) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818308080211 · Cited by 449
Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.2.173 · Cited by 325
IMF conditionality: theory and evidence
Dreher, A. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9486-z · Cited by 297
Metadata
- Authors
- Drazen, A.
- Venue
- IMF Staff Papers
- Published
- 2002-01-01
- Volume
- 49
- Issue
- S1
- Pages
- 36-67
- ISSN
- 1020-7635 (ISSN-L)
- 1564-5150
- OpenAlex
- W3121592304
- Cited by
- 267
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 31.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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