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Financial Advisors and Shareholder Wealth Gains in Corporate Takeovers

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Kale, Jayant R., Kini, Omesh, Ryan, Harley E. · 2003 · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Cited by 223

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We examine the effect of financial advisor reputation on wealth gains in corporate takeovers. In view of the adversarial nature of a takeover, we construct a measure of the relative reputation of the advisor. We document that the absolute wealth gain as well as the share of the total takeover wealth gain accruing to the bidder (target) increases (decreases) as the reputation of the bidder's advisor increases relative to that of the target. We also find that the total wealth created in the takeover is positively related to the reputation of bidder and target advisors. While bidder advisor reputation is positively related to the probability of bid success in our sample, we also present some evidence to suggest that bidders with better advisors are more likely to withdraw from potentially value-destroying takeovers.

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Crossref · 10.2307/4126728

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Citations

Cites

  • Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

    Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 1×

    “Toehold ownership in the target as a determinant of the success of a takeover as well as the price at which the takeover succeeds has received considerable attention in the literature (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Stulz, Walkling, and Song (1990), Walkling (1985), and Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1992)).”
    Background
  • The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance

    Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653 · cited 2×

    “Theorists modeling product markets argue that the desire to build a good reputation provides a firm that offers high quality goods with the incentive to continue providing these high quality products (Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), and Allen (1984)).”
    Background
  • Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations

    Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327 · cited 2×

    “Theorists modeling product markets argue that the desire to build a good reputation provides a firm that offers high quality goods with the incentive to continue providing these high quality products (Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), and Allen (1984)).”
    Background

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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Kale, J. R., Kini, O., & Ryan, H. E.
Venue
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Publisher
JSTOR
Published
2003-09
Volume
38
Issue
3
Pages
475
ISSN
0022-1090 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2167960307
Cited by
223
References
3
FWCI
9.95
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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