The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons
Abstract
With the end of the Cold War, nuclear non-proliferation has emerged as a central issue in international security relations. While most existing works on nuclear proliferation deal with the question of nuclear acquisition, T.V. Paul explains why some states have decided to forswear nuclear weapons even when they have the technological capability or potential capability to develop them, and why some states already in possession of nuclear arms choose to dismantle them.
Overview
Integrity signals
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
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In the citing paper
“According to Paul (2000), security guarantees rather than military pressure is most important in dictating nuclear restraint.”
Citations
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Cited by
Basit, A., Bano, S., & Mahar, I. A. (2026) · ACADEMIA International Journal for Social Sciences · doi:10.63056/academia.5.3(s6).2026.2033
Metadata
- Authors
- Paul, T. V.
- Corresponding author
- Paul, T.V.
- ORCID
- Paul, T.V.
- Venue
- McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- McGill-Queen's University Press
- Published
- 2000-07-26
- OpenAlex
- W4384255984
- Cited by
- 89
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 9.59
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Nuclear Issues and Defense
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Defense, Military, and Policy Studies
- Keywords
- nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, nuclear deterrence, nuclear capabilities, state decision-making, international security, Cold War
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
