The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Investors Benefit from Selective Access to Management?
Open accessAbstract
This paper examines whether selective access to corporate managers allows investors to revise their beliefs and execute profitable trades. We examine whether investors benefit from two potential opportunities for selective access at invitation-only investor conferences: one-on-one meetings with managers throughout the day and breakout sessions with managers after the webcast presentation. We find significant increases in trade sizes during the hours when firms provide offline access to investors, consistent with selective access providing investors with information they perceive to be valuable enough to trade upon. We also find significant potential trading gains concentrated primarily in three-day horizons after the conference for firms providing formal offline access, suggesting that selective access can lead to profitable trading opportunities. These trading gains are associated with analyst notes published during that period, indicating that such notes are one potential source of revelation to the broader market. Our evidence suggests that selective access to management conveys benefits to certain investors even in the post-Reg FD period. JEL Classifications: M41; K22.
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Cites
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
DIAMOND, D. W., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04620.x · Cited by 3,836
Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
LAMBERT, R., LEUZ, C., & VERRECCHIA, R. E. (2007) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2007.00238.x · Cited by 2,586
Evidence of Earnings Management from the Provision for Bad Debts
McNichols, M., & Wilson, G. P. (1988) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491176 · Cited by 919
Cited by
Private Interaction Between Firm Management and Sell‐Side Analysts
SOLTES, E. (2014) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12037 · Cited by 457
Internalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership
He, J. (., Huang, J., & Zhao, S. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019 · Cited by 413
Do Corporate Site Visits Impact Stock Prices?
Cheng, Q., Du, F., Wang, B. Y., & Wang, X. (2019) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12417 · Cited by 292
What Are We Meeting For? The Consequences of Private Meetings with Investors
Solomon, D., & Soltes, E. (2015) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/684038 · Cited by 271
The Effects of Common Ownership on Customer-Supplier Relationships
Freeman, K. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2873199 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Bushee, B. J., Jung, M. J., & Miller, G. S.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Reporting
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 2017-03-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 31-61
- ISSN
- 2380-2146 (ISSN-L)
- 2380-2154
- OpenAlex
- W3122710525
- Cited by
- 182
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 18.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Bushee, B. J., Jung, M. J., & Miller, G. S. (2017). Do Investors Benefit from Selective Access to Management? Journal of Financial Reporting. https://doi.org/10.2308/jfir-51776
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.