The DOI matches its OpenAlex record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation.
Abstract
This study presents an empirical examination of whether managers manipulate earnings through the timing of income recognition from disposal of long-lived assets and investments (hereafter assets). Since managers can often choose the period during which an asset will be sold, and since the principle of acquisition cost underlying the accounting valuation of assets implies that changes in the market value of an asset between acquisition and sale are reported in the period of sale. It follows that there are opportunities for managers to manipulate earnings through the timing of asset sales at relatively low cost. Two common explanations for earnings manipulations are examined: the earnings-smoothing and the debt-equity hypotheses. The earnings-smoothing hypothesis predicts that earnings are manipulated to reduce fluctuations around some level that is considered normal for the firm (see, e.g., Ronen and Sadan 1981, 6). The debt-equity hypothesis suggests a positive relation between a firm's debt-equity ratio and managers' choice of earnings-enhancing activities (see, e.g.. Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 200-21). The findings are consistent with the timing of asset sales by managers so that the recognized income from these sales smooths intemporal earnings changes and mitigates accounting-based restrictions in bond covenants. The results also show that the earnings-smoothing and the debt-equity effects are incremental; after controlling for one effect the other still exists. Finally, sensitivity analysis showing that these results are robust to specifications that consider asset sale levels, bonus plans, possible tax effects, and financial soundness suggests that the findings are not attributable to misspecified statistical tests. The results of this study may be relevant to the ongoing debate about dropping the principle of acquisition cost underlying the accounting valuation of assets in favor of the principle of current cost (see, e.g.. The Wall Street Journal 1990b). While the former is considered reliable, the latter is said to be vulnerable to earnings manipulations because net income is materially affected by management opinion on the sale values of the assets involved (see, e.g., Kieso and Weygandt 1987, 35). The evidence in this study suggests that, despite its reliability, managers take advantage of the acquisition-cost principle to manipulate earnings. This should be considered when evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of acquisition-cost accounting relative to current-cost accounting.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1985) · Andalas University Repository (Andalas University) · Cited by 5,838
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
Smith, C. W., & Warner, J. B. (1979) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(79)90011-4 · Cited by 2,894
The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions
Healy, P. M. (2011) · DSpace@MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) · Cited by 2,579
Evidence of Earnings Management from the Provision for Bad Debts
McNichols, M., & Wilson, G. P. (1988) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491176 · Cited by 919
An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing
Trueman, B., & Titman, S. (1988) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491184 · Cited by 902
Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generations Model
Dye, R. A. (1988) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491102 · Cited by 730
Smoothing income numbers : objectives, means, and implications
Ronen, J., & Sadan, S. (1981) · Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc. eBooks · Cited by 364
An empirical examination of debt covenant restrictions and accounting-related debt proxies
Duke, J. C., & Hunt, H. G. (1990) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(90)90041-2 · Cited by 277
A Perspective on Accounting- Based Debt Covenant Violations.
Smith, C. W. (1993) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9605305933 · Cited by 199
Cited by
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Earnings management through real activities manipulation
Roychowdhury, S. (2006) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.002 · Cited by 5,405
Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences
Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.001 · Cited by 4,159
Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses
Burgstahler, D., & Dichev, I. (1997) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(97)00017-7 · Cited by 3,829
Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.002 · Cited by 2,888
Metadata
- Authors
- Bartov, E.
- Venue
- The Accounting Review
- Publisher
- American Accounting Association
- Published
- 1993-10-01
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 840-855
- ISSN
- 0001-4826 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W81724027
- Cited by
- 529
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 13.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2308/tar-9403090159
- The paper
- Bartov, E. (1993). The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation. The Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9403090159
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.