The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ultra Easy Monetary Policy and the Law of Unintended Consequences
Abstract
In this paper, an attempt is made to evaluate the desirability of ultra easy monetary policy by weighing up the balance of the desirable short run effects and the undesirable longer run effects -the unintended consequences.The conclusion is that there are limits to what central banks can do.One reason for believing this is that monetary stimulus, operating through traditional ("flow") channels, might now be less effective in stimulating aggregate demand than previously.Further, cumulative ("stock") effects provide negative feedback mechanisms that over time also weaken both supply and demand.It is also the case that ultra easy monetary policies can eventually threaten the health of financial institutions and the functioning of financial markets, threaten the "independence" of central banks, and can encourage imprudent behavior on the part of governments.None of these unintended consequences is desirable.Since monetary policy is not "a free lunch", governments must therefore use much more vigorously the policy levers they still control to support strong, sustainable and balanced growth at the global level.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“In practice, a substantive portion has been used to buy existing assets instead, thus leading to booms on real estate and stock markets and to unintended distributive consequences (e.g., De Haan and Eijffinger 2016; White 2012).”
From Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy: The Case of Central Banks (2020) · cites this paper as White 2012
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Kindleberger, C. P., & Aliber, R. Z. (2005) · doi:10.1057/9780230628045 · Cited by 821
Cited by
The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?
Borio, C. (2014) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.031 · Cited by 1,130
Independent Agencies, Distribution, and Legitimacy: The Case of Central Banks
DIETSCH, P. (2020) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055419000790 · Cited by 60
Metadata
- Authors
- White, W. R.
- Venue
- Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Papers
- Publisher
- Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 2012
- Issue
- 126
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 1
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Ultra Easy Monetary Policy and the Law of Unintended Consequences. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.24149/gwp126
- The paper
- White, W. R. (2012). Ultra Easy Monetary Policy and the Law of Unintended Consequences. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Papers. https://doi.org/10.24149/gwp126
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.