The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Board Composition and Corporate Fraud
Abstract
The study reported here examined how various characteristics of the board of directors and other governance features affected the occurrence of U.S. corporate fraud in the 1978–2001 period. The findings suggest that board composition and the structure of a board's oversight committees are significantly correlated with the incidence of corporate fraud. In the sample, as the number of independent outside directors increased on a board and in the board's audit and compensation committees, the likelihood of corporate wrongdoing decreased.
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Citations
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Cited by
Ownership structure, corporate governance, and fraud: Evidence from China
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Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud
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Metadata
- Authors
- Uzun, H., Szewczyk, S. H., & Varma, R.
- Venue
- Financial Analysts Journal
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2004-05
- Volume
- 60
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 33-43
- ISSN
- 0015-198X (ISSN-L)
- 1938-3312
- OpenAlex
- W2061348311
- Cited by
- 530
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 40.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.