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Cited by 1Embodied and Extended CognitionCognitive Science and Education ResearchPhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Affective value in the predictive mind

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Van de Cruys, Sander·2017·MIND Group
DOI 10.25358/openscience-647
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Abstract

Although affective value is fundamental in explanations of behavior, it is still a somewhat alien concept in cognitive science. It implies a normativity or directionality that mere information processing models cannot seem to provide. In this paper we trace how affective value can emerge from information processing in the brain, as described by predictive processing. We explain the grounding of predictive processing in homeostasis, and articulate the implications this has for the concept of reward and motivation. However, at first sight, this new conceptualization creates a strong tension with conventional ideas on reward and affective experience. We propose this tension can be resolved by realizing that valence, a core component of all emotions, might be the reflection of a specific aspect of predictive information processing, namely the dynamics in prediction errors across time and the expectations we, in turn, form about these dynamics. Specifically, positive affect seems to be caused by positive rates of prediction error reduction, while negative affect is induced by a shift in a state with lower prediction errors to one with higher prediction errors (i.e., a negative rate of error reduction). We also consider how intense emotional episodes might be related to unexpected changes in prediction errors, suggesting that we also build (meta)predictions on error reduction rates. Hence in this account emotions appear as the continuous non-conceptual feedback on evolving —increasing or decreasing—uncertainties relative to our predictions. The upshot of this view is that the various emotions, from “basic” ones to the non-typical ones such as humor, curiosity and aesthetic affects, can be shown to follow a single underlying logic. Our analysis takes several cues from existing emotion theories but deviates from them in revealing ways. The account on offer does not just specify the interactions between emotion and cognition, rather it entails a deep integration of the two.

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Cited by

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Authors
Van de Cruys, S.
Venue
MIND Group
Publisher
MIND Group
Published
2017
DOI
10.25358/openscience-647
OpenAlex
W6945073625
Cited by
1
References
0
Citations by year
2024: 1
FWCI
0.00
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Gutenberg Open Science (submittedVersion, cc-by-nd)
  • Gutenberg Open Science
Funders
  • Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
  • Vlaamse regering (METH 08/02)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
emotional value, predictive processing, valence, homeostasis, reward, motivation, emotions, emotion-cognition integration, humor, curiosity

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