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Cited by 177Philosophical Ethics and TheoryEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge

Open access
Shafer-Landau, Russ·2013·Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
DOI 10.26556/jesp.v7i1.68
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Abstract

This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral realism is true, then we can have no warranted moral beliefs, and hence no moral knowledge. In response, I first develop what is perhaps the most natural reply on behalf of realism—namely, that many of our highly presumptively warranted moral beliefs are immune to evolutionary influence and so can be used to assess and eventually resuscitate the epistemic merits of those that have been subject to such influence. I then identify five distinct ways in which the charge of massive coincidence has been understood and defended. I argue that each interpretation is subject to serious worries. If I am right, these putative defeaters are themselves subject to defeat. Thus many of our moral beliefs continue to be highly warranted, even if moral realism is true.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

Shafer-Landau defends moral realism against evolutionary debunking arguments by reconstructing the “Darwinian Argument” and arguing that its central premises—especially D1, D3, and D5—are inadequately supported. He concludes that moral realism remains compatible with moral knowledge and warranted moral belief.

Key findings

  • The evolutionary debunkers’ master argument, reconstructed as D1–D11, aims to show that if moral realism is true and evolutionary forces have thoroughly shaped our moral faculties in doxastically discriminating ways, then our moral beliefs are unwarranted and we have no moral knowledge.
  • Shafer-Landau argues that the crucial premise D5—that evolutionary forces have thoroughly shaped our moral faculties in doxastically discriminating ways—is “far from well confirmed,” and that D3—that there is no independent confirmation of the reliability of our moral faculties—is also uncertain.
  • He examines five interpretations of the alleged “massive coincidence” (odds, insensitivity, confirmed doxastic effects, empiricist, causal) and finds none gives adequate reason to accept D1.
  • He proposes that realists can use the “Natural Reply,” relying on highly presumptively warranted moral beliefs that are apparently maladaptive and thus not obviously products of evolutionary influence, to assess and rehabilitate other moral beliefs.

Methods

  • Conceptual and philosophical analysis; no empirical data, sample, or statistical analysis are reported.
  • The paper reconstructs evolutionary debunking arguments into premise-conclusion form, especially the Darwinian Argument (D1–D11), the Uncertainty Argument, the Probability Argument, the Insensitivity Argument, the Doxastic Effect Argument, the Empiricist Argument, and the Causal Argument.
  • It evaluates each premise and considers realist replies, including the Natural Reply, semantic competence with moral concepts, parity with perceptual and a priori knowledge, and formal strategies of faculty vindication.

Limitations

  • The paper states that D5 is an uncertain empirical hypothesis and that evolutionary accounts are in many ways “just-so stories” based on thin evidence about prehistoric events.
  • It states that the status of D3 is uncertain and depends on whether realists can develop a successful formal strategy for vindicating the reliability of our moral faculties; it says “the jury is out” on how feasible such a strategy is.
  • It acknowledges that it has not argued for the existence of a priori moral truths and that its proposed replies do not provide a complete account of nonnaturalistic moral knowledge.
  • Evident from the text: the paper offers no empirical testing or new data; its conclusions rest on conceptual argument and on the current state of philosophical debate.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.26556/jesp.v7i1.68

Cites

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 of 2 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

Show all 95 claims

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 42
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 27
63 of 63

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There is no independent confirmation of the reliability of our moral faculties; their reliability can be confirmed only by showing that they have generated moral beliefs in which we have a high degree of warranted confidence.

    “D3.There is no independent confirmation of the reliability of our moral facultiestheir reliability can be confirmed only by showing that they have generated moral beliefs in which we have a high degree of warranted confidence.”
    “For now, though, we can proceed on the assumption of its truth”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    If there is decisive reason to believe that our moral faculties are unreliable, and if those reasons are accessible to us, then this defeats any warrant we might have for our moral beliefs.

    “D7.If there is decisive reason to believe that our moral faculties are unreliable, and if those reasons are accessible to us, then this defeats any warrant we might have for our moral beliefs.”
    “Both D7 and D10 strike me as extremely plausible, and I will assume their truth in what follows.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Those reasons (in the form of D1-D6, and the considerations that support them) are accessible to us.

    “D8.Those reasons (in the form of D1-D6, and the considerations that support them) are accessible to us.”
    “So I will proceed on the assumption that D8 is correct.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    If our moral beliefs are unwarranted, then we have no moral knowledge.

    “D10.If our moral beliefs are unwarranted, then we have no moral knowledge.”
    “Both D7 and D10 strike me as extremely plausible, and I will assume their truth in what follows.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    For all we know, there is a reasonable chance that evolutionary forces have thoroughly shaped our moral faculties in doxastically discriminating ways.

    “U2.For all we know, there is a reasonable chance that evolutionary forces have thoroughly shaped our moral faculties in doxastically discriminating ways.”
    “U2 is plausible, and I will assume its truth in what follows.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    If, for all we know, there is a reasonable chance that our moral faculties are unreliable, then we must suspend judgment about all of our moral beliefs.

    “U4.If, for all we know, there is a reasonable chance that our moral faculties are unreliable, then we must suspend judgment about all of our moral beliefs.”
    “Though U4 is contestable, I will not argue against it here.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Nonmoral claims alone are incapable of certifying any substantive moral claims.

    “on the plausible assumption that (trivial, aberrant cases aside 10 ) nonmoral claims alone are incapable of certifying any substantive moral claims.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Skepticism about nearly everything is erroneous.

    “Assuming that such skepticism is erroneous”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Debunkers are trying to identify something especially worrisome about moral knowledge, rather than developing an argument for global skepticism.

    “and also assuming that debunkers are trying to identify something especially worrisome about moral knowledge, rather than developing an argument for global skepticism”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Moral facts are causally inert (assumed for the sake of argument).

    “let us now consider the worst-case scenario for the realist, and assume the causal inefficacy of moral facts.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    There is some plausible form of an is-ought gap (an inference barrier between empirical claims and normative truths).

    “If we assume the existence of some such inference barrier, then unless one is willing to give up on the truth and credibility of all normative claims, we will have to accept that empirical inquiry alone will fail to reveal the truth and the epistemic status of our normative beliefs.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The first premise of the Empiricist Argument (E1) is true.

    “I think that the first premise of this argument is probably true.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A priori knowable propositions are metaphysically necessary truths, with only irrelevant exceptions.

    “With a few possible exceptions that are irrelevant for present purposes, a priori knowable propositions are metaphysically necessary truths.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A priori truths, or the facts they represent, do not cause anything.

    “Such truths, or the facts they represent, do not cause anything.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Instances of a priori apprehension are physical events.

    “Further, instances of a priori apprehension are themselves physical events.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    We must trace the warrant of our moral beliefs to the exercise of our moral faculties.

    “On the assumption that we must trace the warrant of our moral beliefs to the exercise of our moral faculties, any doubts about those faculties will be inherited by those beliefs.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Nonmoral beliefs cannot by themselves justify positive moral beliefs.

    “And further assuming that nonmoral beliefs cannot by themselves justify positive moral beliefs, we are left adrift if we are unable to answer the debunking critiques.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The moral domain is autonomous.

    “Independence strategies are out (given the autonomy of the moral).”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There is an inference barrier from is to ought.

    “Indeed, given the truth of any plausible inference barrier from is to ought, we will have to rely on substantive moral or evaluative claims in order to positively establish the existence of a correlation between selective pressures and the reliability of our moral faculties.”
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Metadata

Authors
Shafer-Landau, R.
Affiliations
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Venue
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Publisher
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Published
2013-01-01
Volume
7
Issue
1
Pages
1-38
ISSN
1559-3061 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.26556/jesp.v7i1.68
OpenAlex
W330102725
Semantic Scholar
3e748e37d295ef268384ad72c4677541f203d77f
Cited by
177
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 19 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 1
FWCI
75.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Keywords
evolutionary debunking arguments, moral realism, moral knowledge, moral epistemology, moral sense, warrants, moral beliefs, moral intuitions

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