DESTRUCTIVE INFLUENCES OF MEDIA ON THE FORMATION OF CONTEMPORARY UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM
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ДЕСТРУКТИВНІ ВПЛИВИ МЕДІА НА ФОРМУВАННЯ
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TL;DR
The paper argues that contemporary Ukrainian nationalism faces systematic negative media pressure from three sources: pro-Russian outlets, liberal media, and oligarch-controlled media. It concludes that these influences distort public perceptions of nationalism and recommends stronger information policy, a state national narrative, and media literacy.
Key findings
- Pro-Russian media systematically equate Ukrainian nationalism with fascism, Nazism, and xenophobia; in 2021, the “extremism/Nazism/radicals in Ukraine” narrative accounted for 9.64% of materials with pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives.
- As of 2020, OPZZh party media and Strana.ua produced 90% of pro-Kremlin messages in Ukraine’s national information space, according to the paper.
- Liberal media, including Ukrainska Pravda and TSN, are described as framing nationalism as incompatible with European values and tolerance, especially in coverage of conflicts with the LGBT community.
- Oligarchic media control is illustrated with 2018 audience shares: TRK Ukraina 14.24 (Akhmetov), Inter 9.37 (Firtash/Levonchkin), 1+1 8.71 (Kolomoisky), ICTV 7.27 (Pinchuk), and STB 7.04 (Pinchuk).
Methods
- The study uses content analysis, historical, and statistical approaches to examine media constructions of Ukrainian nationalism during Russia’s full-scale aggression and information war.
- It draws on media-monitoring reports from the Institute of Mass Information and Detector Media for 2020–2021, Ukrainian Institute for the Future data on 2018 TV audience shares, and selected publications from outlets such as Strana.ua, 112ua, ZIK, Ukrainska Pravda, and TSN.
- The analysis is qualitative and illustrative, organizing findings around pro-Russian, liberal, and oligarchic media types rather than a formal sampled dataset.
Limitations
- The paper does not state explicit limitations.
- Evident from the text: the study relies heavily on secondary monitoring reports and selected media examples, with no transparent sampling frame or coding protocol.
- It does not measure audience effects quantitatively, and its wartime Ukrainian context limits generalization beyond that setting.
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Hybrid warfare includes informational and psychological campaigns designed to transform public opinion destructively in targeted countries.
“The article also highlights the impact of informational and psychological campaigns designed to transform public opinion destructively in the targeted countries.”
From Hybrid Warfare and Customs Security: Strengthening Resilience for Sustainable Development (2025) · cites this paper as Savliuk, 2024
The Additional information section describes an information war accompanying Russia’s invasion and media efforts to construct a negative public image of Ukrainian nationalism. The Abstract likewise says pro-Russian media deliberately spread narratives intended to divide Ukrainian society. These passages support the claim about destructive efforts to shape public opinion in Ukraine, but do not establish the broader characterization of informational and psychological campaigns across targeted countries as a feature of hybrid warfare. (LLM, conf=0.83)
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- Authors
- Savliuk, B.
- Corresponding author
- Savliuk, Bohdan
- ORCID
- Savliuk, Bohdan
- Venue
- Visnyk of the Lviv University
- Published
- 2025
- Issue
- 61
- Pages
- 484-494
- ISSN
- 2307-1664 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4417094852
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- uk
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Locations
- Visnyk of the Lviv University (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › European Cultural and National Identity
- Social Sciences › Communication › Media Studies and Communication
- Keywords
- media influence, national identity formation, media and nationalism
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