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Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'right to an explanation' is probably not the remedy you are looking for
Open accessAbstract
Cite as Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale, 'Slave to the Algorithm? Why a 'right to an explanation' is probably not the remedy you are looking for' (2017) 16 Duke Law and Technology Review 18–84. (First posted on SSRN 24 May 2017)Algorithms, particularly machine learning (ML) algorithms, are increasingly important to individuals’ lives, but have caused a range of concerns revolving mainly around unfairness, discrimination and opacity. Transparency in the form of a “right to an explanation” has emerged as a compellingly attractive remedy since it intuitively promises to “open the black box” to promote challenge, redress, and hopefully heightened accountability. Amidst the general furore over algorithmic bias we describe, any remedy in a storm has looked attractive.However, we argue that a right to an explanation in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is unlikely to present a complete remedy to algorithmic harms, particularly in some of the core “algorithmic war stories” that have shaped recent attitudes in this domain. Firstly, the law is restrictive, unclear, or even paradoxical concerning when any explanation-related right can be triggered. Secondly, even navigating this, the legal conception of explanations as “meaningful information about the logic of processing” may not be provided by the kind of ML “explanations” computer scientists have developed, partially in response. ML explanations are restricted both by the type of explanation sought, the dimensionality of the domain and the type of user seeking an explanation. However, “subject-centric" explanations (SCEs) focussing on particular regions of a model around a query show promise for interactive exploration, as do explanation systems based on learning a model from outside rather than taking it apart (pedagogical vs decompositional explanations ) in dodging developers' worries of IP or trade secrets disclosure.Based on our analysis, we fear that the search for a “right to an explanation” in the GDPR may be at best distracting, and at worst nurture a new kind of “transparency fallacy.” But all is not lost. We argue that other parts of the GDPR related (i) to the right to erasure ("right to be forgotten") and the right to data portability; and (ii) to privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification and privacy seals, may have the seeds we can use to make algorithms more responsible, explicable, and human-centred.
Overview
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TL;DR
The paper argues that a GDPR “right to an explanation” is unlikely to provide a complete remedy for algorithmic harms because the legal triggers are restrictive or unclear and ML explanations may not supply legally “meaningful information about the logic of processing.” It suggests subject-centric and pedagogical explanations, plus other GDPR tools such as erasure, portability, DPIAs, privacy by design, and certification, as more promising avenues.
Key findings
- The claimed GDPR right to explanation is legally shaky: Article 22 is limited to decisions based “solely” on automated processing that produce legal or similarly significant effects, with carve-outs and safeguards; Recital 71’s explanation mention is not in the main text, and recitals have uncertain binding force. In Sweeney’s AdSense study of 2,184 racially associated names, a black-identifying name was 25% more likely to get an arrest-related ad on one site, but it is hard to show a “decision” significantly affecting an individual.
- ML explanations face barriers: model-centric explanations (MCEs) versus subject-centric explanations (SCEs), the “curse of dimensionality,” and tasks with many variables—e.g., LinkedIn claims over 100,000 variables per user—make meaningful explanation difficult. A system with 90% predictive accuracy would be expected to fail at least 10% of the time on new unseen data.
- SCEs and pedagogical explanations are promising: SCEs focus on regions of a model around a query and can support interactive mental models; pedagogical/model-agnostic explanations query the model as an oracle and may avoid IP or trade-secret disclosure.
- Other GDPR remedies may be more useful: erasure (Article 17) and portability (Article 20) have limits, especially for inferences; DPIAs (Article 35), privacy by design (Article 25), DPOs (Article 37), and certification/seals (Article 42) may help create better algorithmic governance. Fines can reach €20m or 4% of global turnover for severe breaches.
Methods
- Design: interdisciplinary legal and technical conceptual analysis; no empirical experiment or dataset is used.
- Data/sample: EU GDPR and Data Protection Directive provisions, EU case law, regulatory guidance, ML explanation literature, and media-reported “algorithmic war stories” such as Sweeney’s AdSense study, Google Spain, Target pregnancy profiling, and ProPublica’s criminal-risk assessment reporting.
- Main analysis: textual/doctrinal reading of GDPR Articles 22, 15, 17, 20, 25, 35, 37, and 42; distinguishes MCEs/SCEs and decompositional/pedagogical explanations; assesses whether explanation rights and alternative remedies can meaningfully address algorithmic harms.
Limitations
- Paper-stated: the broad scope across very different ML systems “may lead to some misleading generalisations”; there is a lack of empirical research on whether users seeking explanations are likely to be statistically anomalous “rare birds”; recitals’ legal status is murky and European case law is scarce.
- Evident from the text: no empirical validation or user study is conducted; the analysis relies on selected war stories and literature; the legal interpretation is EU-focused and may be unsettled by future case law or regulatory guidance.
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“data subjects increasingly perceive themselves as having little control over the collection of their personal data that go into profiles.”
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- Not matchedcites EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DATA PROTECTION EUROOBAROMETER, (June 2015)
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“In the few modern EU legal cases we have on controlling algorithmic governance, an explanation has not usually been the remedy sought.”
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In the paper
“A similar desire for an action, not for an explanation, can be seen in the various European 'autocomplete defamation' cases. 106”
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [106]
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“It is interesting that in the context of open datasets as a successor to FOI, there is considerable evidence that disclosure (voluntary or mandated) of apparently greater quantities of government data does not necessarily equal more effective scrutiny or better governance. 96”
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“In an even earlier incident of notoriety in 2004, the Google search algorithm(s) placed a site 'Jew Watch' at the top of the rankings for many people who searched for the word 'Jew.'”
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- Not matchedcites [124]
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“Rather, people are concerned with broader aspects of ADM: the purposes, roles, and outcomes of decision-making processes as a whole, as it is the whole process that affects them rather than simply certain technical aspects of it [26].”
From Reviewable Automated Decision-Making: A Framework for Accountable Algorithmic Systems (2021) · cites this paper as [26]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Often, users have little use for a precise breakdown of such scores due to a high complexity.”
From Trust-Building in Peer-to-Peer Carsharing: Design Case Study for Algorithm-Based Reputation Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Edwards and Veale, 2017
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Edwards and Vaele (Edwards and Veale, 2017) discuss, e.g., the right of explanation in the context of automated decision-making. They argue that this right of explanation is helpful but is only a transparency fallacy (Edwards and Veale, 2017; Team IGP, 2020).”
From Trust-Building in Peer-to-Peer Carsharing: Design Case Study for Algorithm-Based Reputation Systems (2024) · cites this paper as Edwards and Veale, 2017
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Moreover, by focusing on models and holding individuals themselves responsible for understanding how they work, broader technical and organisational processes and other systemic issues are obscured, and attention is diverted from other (perhaps more relevant) factors [2,26].”
From Reviewable Automated Decision-Making: A Framework for Accountable Algorithmic Systems (2021) · cites this paper as [26]
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“There are limits to transparency itself as a mechanism for supporting accountability [2,26,68].”
From Reviewable Automated Decision-Making: A Framework for Accountable Algorithmic Systems (2021) · cites this paper as [26]
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In the paper
§ CONCLUSION · p. 65
“However, radically, in section IV we found that some of the new tools in the GDPR, in particular the mandatory requirements for Privacy by Design and DPIAs, and opportunities for certification systems, might go beyond the individual”
§ V. BEYOND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE GDPR: PRIVACY BY DESIGN · p. 57
“## V. BEYOND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE GDPR: PRIVACY BY DESIGN”
Citations
Cites
Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results
Dwork, C. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79228-4_1 · Cited by 3,542
Explaining nonlinear classification decisions with deep taylor decomposition
Montavon, G., Lapuschkin, S., Binder, A., Samek, W., & Müller, K.-R. (2017) · Pattern Recognition · doi:10.1016/j.patcog.2016.11.008 · Cited by 1,357
The effects of transparency on trust in and acceptance of a content-based art recommender
Cramer, H., Evers, V., Ramlal, S., van Someren, M., Rutledge, L., Stash, N., Aroyo, L., & Wielinga, B. (2008) · User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction · doi:10.1007/s11257-008-9051-3 · Cited by 448
The Role of Explanations on Trust and Reliance in Clinical Decision Support Systems
Bussone, A., Stumpf, S., & O'Sullivan, D. (2015) · 2015 International Conference on Healthcare Informatics · doi:10.1109/ichi.2015.26 · Cited by 441
A path to understanding the effects of algorithm awareness
Hamilton, K., Karahalios, K. G., Sandvig, C., & Eslami, M. (2014) · CHI Conference Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI EA) · doi:10.1145/2559206.2578883 · Cited by 156
Data protection impact assessments: a meta-regulatory approach
Binns, R. (2017) · International Data Privacy Law · doi:10.1093/idpl/ipw027 · Cited by 130
Algorithmic Transparency via Quantitative Input Influence
Datta, A., Sen, S., & Zick, Y. (2017) · Studies in big data · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-54024-5_4 · Cited by 89
Developing a privacy seal scheme (that works)
Rodrigues, R., Wright, D., & Wadhwa, K. (2013) · International Data Privacy Law · doi:10.1093/idpl/ips037 · Cited by 23
Cited by
Arrieta, A. B., Díaz-Rodríguez, N., Del Ser, J., Bennetot, A., Tabik, S., Barbado, A., García, S., Gil-López, S., Molina, D., Benjamins, R., et al. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.10045 · Cited by 11,321
Barredo Arrieta, A., Díaz-Rodríguez, N., Del Ser, J., Bennetot, A., Tabik, S., Barbado, A., Garcia, S., Gil-Lopez, S., Molina, D., Benjamins, R., et al. (2020) · Information Fusion · doi:10.1016/j.inffus.2019.12.012 · Cited by 10,423
Ali, S., Abuhmed, T., El-Sappagh, S., Muhammad, K., Alonso-Moral, J. M., Confalonieri, R., Guidotti, R., Del Ser, J., Díaz-Rodríguez, N., & Herrera, F. (2023) · Information Fusion · doi:10.1016/j.inffus.2023.101805 · Cited by 1,762
(2019) · doi:10.1080/1369118x.2019.1573914 · Cited by 719
'It's Reducing a Human Being to a Percentage': Perceptions of Justice in Algorithmic Decisions
Binns, R., Van Kleek, M., Veale, M., Lyngs, U., Zhao, J., & Shadbolt, N. (2018) · Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3173574.3173951 · Cited by 691
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Edwards, L., & Veale, M.
- Affiliations
- University of Strathclyde (GB)
- Publisher
- Center for Open Science
- Published
- 2017-11-18
- OpenAlex
- W4300071243
- Cited by
- 524
- References
- 8
- Citations by year
- 2026: 26 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 52 · 2023: 130 · 2022: 57 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 89 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 8
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Strathprints: The University of Strathclyde institutional repository (University of Strathclyde) (acceptedVersion)
- Duke Law Scholarship Repository (Duke University) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- LawArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Arts and Humanities Research Council
- Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
- Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
- Keywords
- algorithmic transparency, algorithmic discrimination, algorithmic bias, General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR, right to be forgotten, data portability, privacy by design, data protection impact assessment, algorithmic accountability, algorithmic harms
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