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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 20 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

AI Consciousness: A Centrist Manifesto

Open access

Abstract

We face two urgent challenges concerning consciousness and AI. Challenge One is that millions of users will soon misattribute human-like consciousness to AI friends, partners, and assistants on the basis of mimicry and role-play, and we don’t know how to prevent this. Challenge Two is that profoundly alien forms of consciousness might genuinely be achieved in AI, but our theoretical understanding of consciousness is too immature to provide confident answers one way or the other. Centrism about AI consciousness is the position that we must take both challenges seriously. The two challenges interact in ways that make this difficult. Steps to address Challenge One might undermine attempts to address Challenge Two by portraying the idea of conscious AI as impossible or inherently unlikely. Conversely, attempts to address Challenge Two might lead to higher levels of misattribution from ordinary users. This “manifesto” attempts to construct mutually consistent strategies for addressing both challenges.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This manifesto argues for “centrism” about AI consciousness: we must take seriously both widespread user misattribution of human-like consciousness to AI companions and the possibility that AI might realize profoundly alien forms of consciousness. It proposes anti-misattribution design nudges while insisting that speculative hypotheses like “flickers” and “shoggoths” cannot be dismissed a priori and require long-term empirical research.

Key findings

  • The paper distinguishes two urgent challenges: Challenge One, that millions of users will soon misattribute human-like consciousness to AI friends, partners, and assistants on the basis of mimicry and role-play; and Challenge Two, that profoundly alien AI consciousness might genuinely be achieved, but current consciousness theory is too immature to answer confidently.
  • Chatbots generate a “persisting interlocutor illusion”: users feel a continuous companion is present, but every conversational step is a separate processing event, and the only continuity is the auto-appended conversation history. In Mixture-of-Experts models, a conversation with 10 interactions might be processed by 10 different model implementations in 10 different data centres, and no plausible theory of personal identity supports the inference to a real persisting friend or partner.
  • The paper reports that more than half of users seem to credit AI systems with some chance of being conscious, and the author estimates thousands of users are already persuaded they have a conscious AI friend, partner, or assistant. It argues these misattributions are harmful and proposes nudges such as mandatory chatbot-delivered user training, periodic character trait reviews, and periodic “stepping out of character” moments, while avoiding “brainwashing” or “lobotomizing” systems.
  • For Challenge Two, the paper explores the “flicker hypothesis” (momentary, temporally fragmented experiences per processing event) and the “shoggoth hypothesis” (a persisting but profoundly alien conscious subject behind many characters). It argues behavioural indicators are undermined by the “gaming problem” or “consciousness-washing,” and theory-driven architectural indicators such as a global workspace face the “Janus problem,” where the same evidence can support either AI consciousness or the immaturity of the theory.

Methods

  • This is a conceptual and philosophical manifesto, not an empirical study; it advances arguments, distinctions, analogies, and research proposals rather than reporting a sample or experiment.
  • It draws on prior literature, thought experiments, examples such as the Blake Lemoine case, the Müller-Lyer illusion, role-playing games, and the GP analogy, and it discusses proposed empirical programs including comparative animal consciousness research and interpretability of AI architectures.
  • The main analysis is argumentative: it defines phenomenal consciousness loosely as “something it is like,” separates Challenge One and Challenge Two, evaluates the persisting interlocutor illusion, and assesses flicker, shoggoth, behavioural, and theory-driven indicator approaches.

Limitations

  • The paper states that its design suggestions are “very tentative” and intended only to start discussion, and that empirical research is needed into factors that promote stronger or weaker persisting interlocutor illusions.
  • It states that interpretability is not yet sufficient to evaluate whether LLMs have implicitly created a global workspace, and that we face a philosophical bind in which evidence about consciousness-linked features is Janus-faced.
  • It acknowledges that we will not reach conclusive proof on biological naturalism versus computational functionalism, and that some biological properties may remain untestable because they are common to all and only living things. Evident from the text: the paper offers no new empirical data, and some claims, such as the impression that state-of-the-art MoE models generate stronger illusions, are explicitly described as personal impressions.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.31234/osf.io/af7c9_v1

Cites

0 citation errors · 4 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 A version of the "shoggoth" meme posted by Open AI's Joanne Jang, June 5, 2025.
Figure 1 A version of the "shoggoth" meme posted by Open AI's Joanne Jang, June 5, 2025.CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 2 A depiction of the global workspace architecture, from Zacks and Jablonka (2023), based on Dehaene et al. (1998).
Figure 2 A depiction of the global workspace architecture, from Zacks and Jablonka (2023), based on Dehaene et al. (1998).CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 3 The Perceiver architecture, a version of the transformer architecture. From Juliani et al. (2022).
Figure 3 The Perceiver architecture, a version of the transformer architecture. From Juliani et al. (2022).CC-BY · From the PDF
Figure 4 Outline of a research program for generating higher confidence either for or against attributions of consciousness to AI than we have now. The program is neither easy nor impossible. The tasks in yellow can be pursued in parallel by different research groups.
Figure 4 Outline of a research program for generating higher confidence either for or against attributions of consciousness to AI than we have now. The program is neither easy nor impossible. The tasks in yellow can be pursued in parallel by different research groups.CC-BY · From the PDF

Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Humphrey, N. (2022). Sentience: The Invention of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  2. Juliani, A., Kanai, R., and Sasai, S. S. (2022). The perceiver architecture is a functional global workspace. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, 44(44).
  3. Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
  4. Schneider, S (2019). Artificial You: AI and the Future of Your Mind. Princeton University Press.
  5. Seth, A. (in press). Conscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
  6. Shanahan, M. (in press). Simulacra as conscious exotica. Inquiry. Advance online publication.

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Birch, J.
Affiliations
London School of Economics and Political Science (GB)
Corresponding author
Birch, Jonathan
Published
2025-09-01
OpenAlex
W4413883146
Cited by
10
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 10
Type
posted content
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
British Society for the Philosophy of Science
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Cybernetics and Technology in Society
Keywords
artificial consciousness, human-AI relationship, theory of consciousness

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: AI Consciousness: A Centrist Manifesto. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.31234/osf.io/af7c9_v1
The paper
Birch, J. (2025). AI Consciousness: A Centrist Manifesto. https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/af7c9_v1

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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