Avrupa Birliği’yle Hindistan Arasında Sonuçlanamayan Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması Müzakereleri: İki Seviyeli Oyun Analizi
Open accessAbstract
This article examines the arduous free trade agreement negotiations between the European Union and India. The talks, which started in 2006 and were suspended for a while, could not lead to an agreement in more than 15 years. By employing the two-level game theory, developed by Robert Putnam, this article attempts to explore the role of the domestic realm on the extension of the negotiations. Therefore, it investigates the win-sets of the negotiating parties, by focusing on the domestic factors such as interest groups, political structure and political culture in order to determine which of these factors make it difficult to find common ground. On the basis of the said analysis regarding the free trade agreement negotiations between the European Union and India, this article further aims at finding out why trade negotiations pursued by the European Union usually require a long period of time.
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References 10
- Authors
- ATAK, Y. G.
- Affiliations
- Galatasaray University (TR)
- Corresponding author
- ATAK, Yusuf Gökhan
- ORCID
- ATAK, Yusuf Gökhan
- Venue
- Ankara Avrupa Calismalari Dergisi
- Publisher
- Ankara Avrupa Calismalari Dergisi
- Published
- 2022-08-05
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 69-93
- ISSN
- 1303-2518 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4288050150
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- tr
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- Locations
- Ankara Avrupa Calismalari Dergisi (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- DergiPark (Istanbul University) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European Union Policy and Governance
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Global Political and Economic Relations
- Keywords
- free trade agreement negotiations, two-level game theory, interest groups, political structure, political culture, negotiation duration, EU trade policy
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