Cited by 3Network Security and Intrusion DetectionFault Detection and Control SystemsSmart Grid Security and Resilience

Industrial Control Anomaly Detection Based on Distributed Linear Deep Learning

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Tang, Shijie, Ding, Yong, Wang, Huiyong·2025·Computers, Materials & Continua

Abstract

As more and more devices in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are connected to the Internet, physical components such as programmable logic controller (PLC), sensors, and actuators are facing greater risks of network attacks, and ... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on Tech Science Press

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Crossref · 10.32604/cmc.2024.059143

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  • Process data are particularly suitable for attacks that perturb the physical process state while keeping network-level statistics relatively unchanged, such as false data injection, malicious command or parameter manipulation, process-oriented attacks, and stealthy drifts in sensor trajectories.

    “First, process data are particularly suitable for attacks that perturb the physical process state while keeping network-level statistics relatively unchanged-such as false data injection, malicious command or parameter manipulation, process-oriented attacks, and stealthy drifts in sensor trajectories [67,69-73,75,76].”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [67]

    The Introduction describes false sensor-data injection and tampered PLC control logic that can alter physical processes. It does not say that these attacks leave network-level statistics relatively unchanged, nor does it discuss stealthy drifts in sensor trajectories. The cited paper therefore supports the process-attack examples, but not the full characterization. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The distribution of datasets shows a strong reliance on SWaT and WADI for benchmarking prediction-residual-based methods, with additional evidence from custom-built avionics, robotics, temperature-control, offshore wind farm, and simulation-based CPS testbeds.

    “Finally, the distribution of datasets shows a strong reliance on SWaT and WADI for benchmarking prediction-residual-based methods, with additional evidence from custombuilt avionics, robotics, temperature-control, offshore wind farm, and simulation-based CPS testbeds [67-73,75,76].”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [67]

    Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

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  • In many works, a model predicts the next-step sensor or control-signal values and computes prediction residuals, or derives an anomaly score that functions as a probabilistic or density-based residual, so that small but systematic deviations in process dynamics can be detected even when they are not visible at the network layer.

    “In many of these works, a model predicts the next-step sensor or control-signal values and computes prediction residuals, or derives an anomaly score that functions as a probabilistic or density-based residual, so that small but systematic deviations in process dynamics can be detected even when they are not visible at the network layer [67,69,70,72,73,75].”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [67]

    Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The DL-AD method can detect anomaly sequential changes quickly and accurately even in large-scale ICS environments through distributed processing.

    “Through distributed processing, the method can detect anomaly sequential changes quickly and accurately even in large-scale ICS environments.”
  • Tang et al. [67] proposed an anomaly detection method based on Distributed Linear Deep Learning (DL-AD) using SWaT and WADI datasets.

    “Using the SWaT and WADI datasets, Tang et al. [67] proposed an anomaly detection method based on Distributed Linear Deep Learning (DL-AD).”

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References 20 · Cited by 3

Research works printed but not linked: 21

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Authors
Tang, S., Ding, Y., & Wang, H.
Affiliations
Guilin University of Electronic Technology (CN)
Venue
Computers, Materials & Continua
Published
2025
Volume
82
Issue
1
Pages
1129-1150
ISSN
  • 1546-2218 (ISSN-L)
  • 1546-2226
OpenAlex
W4404618050
Cited by
3
References
20
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 2
FWCI
0.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
Computers, materials & continua/Computers, materials & continua (Print) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62172119)
  • Natural Science Foundation of Guangxi Province (2024GXNSFDA010064, 62172119, 2023GXNSFAA026236)
  • Singapore University of Technology and Design
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Fault Detection and Control Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Keywords
cyber-physical systems, network attacks, programmable logic controller, intrusion detection

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