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AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATIVE PENAL MATTERS

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Comenius University Bratislava, Faculty of Law, Slovak Republic, Lengyel, Alan · 2025 · STUDIA IURIDICA Cassoviensia

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 39 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Automated decision-making in administrative punishment brings new challenges in the area of legal regulation and state responsibility. This article analyses the existing legal regulations that determine the conditions of liability for damage caused by artificial intelligence decisions in administrative law, with an emphasis on administrative punishment. Particular attention is paid to Act No. 514/2003 Coll. on liability for damage caused in the exercise of public authority and its applicability to cases of incorrect official procedures of systems using artificial intelligence. The paper also assesses the impact of European legislation, in particular the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) and the GDPR, on liability relationships in public administration. The article also deals with mechanisms for judicial review of artificial intelligence decisions, the need for transparency and ethical issues of automated decisionmaking. It concludes by identifying key challenges and recommendations for the regulation of artificial intelligence in administrative punishment.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper analyses whether and under what conditions automated decision-making may lawfully be used in Slovak administrative punishment, focusing on state liability under Act No. 514/2003 Coll. and the impact of the GDPR and the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. It concludes that automation is permissible only where rule-of-law principles (legality, transparency, proportionality, defence rights, effective remedies) are upheld, and that "hybrid" decision-making dilutes responsibility.

Key findings

  • Automated decision-making in administrative punishment is lawful only if four conditions are met: a clear legal basis for the authority's use of automated tools; processing of accurate, up-to-date, lawfully processable data; transparency toward data subjects (notification plus explanation of automation's role); and respect for fundamental rights, especially the right to a fair trial.
  • The paper argues AI systems do not meet the requirements of legal subjectivity — they lack independent will, intent, consciousness, property and capacity to be sanctioned — so granting them legal personality would create a "legally empty concept"; a "spectral model" of legal subjectivity is discussed but responsibility must remain specific, identifiable and enforceable.
  • Act No. 514/2003 Coll. (liability for damage caused in the exercise of public authority), grounded in Article 46(3) of the Slovak Constitution, can provide a basis for liability for unlawful decisions or incorrect official procedure, but so-called hybrid decision-making — where the system formally only "proposes" and the human adopts it automatically — dilutes responsibility and weakens identification of the liable entity.
  • The paper proposes a proportionality test before deploying automated systems (criteria: severity of interference, transparency, category of person concerned, existing control mechanisms), a mandatory ex ante impact assessment, algorithmic auditability, the right to individual justification, and a possible shift of the burden of proof toward the public administration given citizens' knowledge asymmetry; it also proposes court-appointed expert explanation of algorithmic decisions.

Methods

  • Design: analytical-deductive legal interpretation, supported by comparison of the legal regulation of the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and relevant EU law (GDPR, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 — the AIA), with practical scenarios of AI use in decision-making as a starting point.
  • The analysis is structured around three research questions: (1) conditions under which an algorithmic system may decide in administrative punishment without human intervention; (2) who is liable for damage caused by an automated decision and under what circumstances; (3) whether the existing Slovak and EU framework sufficiently protects data subjects' fundamental rights.
  • No empirical dataset, sample or statistical analysis is reported; the paper is doctrinal and normative, drawing on case law (e.g. Malige v. France, Jussila v. Finland, Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic PL. ÚS 10/2014 and I. ÚS 258/2021), Council of Europe recommendations (CM/Rec(2007)7, R (91) 1) and academic literature.

Limitations

  • The paper states that in the Slovak Republic the topic "has not yet been systematically addressed by legal theory," with discussion occurring mainly at the ethical-technological level or in connection with digitalisation as a whole; it positions itself as building on Czech research impulses and adding a Slovak perspective.
  • Evident from the text: the analysis is purely doctrinal with no empirical testing, case data or quantitative evidence; the liability conclusions are framed as open questions and de lege ferenda proposals rather than settled answers.
  • Evident from the text: the paper repeatedly uses hypothetical illustrations (e.g. an automated traffic-offence fine based on incorrectly evaluated data, "for example, in the case of poor calibration of measuring devices") rather than documented instances, so the practical scope of the identified liability gaps is not demonstrated.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.33542/sic2025-s-07

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1 Valid · 1 Not valid · 35 Not checked · 27 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

The publisher hasn’t deposited this paper’s reference list.

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. [12]12. SVÁK, J. In: OROSZ, L., J. SVÁK a kol. Ústava Slovenskej republiky. Komentár. 1. zväzok (základné princípy a ľudské práva). Bratislava: Wolters Kluwer, 2021, 892 s. ISBN 9788057103813
  2. [15]15. ALMIOTTO, F. When Is a Decision Automated? A Taxonomy for a Fundamental Rights Analysis. Forthcoming in German Law Review, s. 1-27 Dostupné z: https://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=4578761 [cit. 12. 04. 2025].

Metadata

Authors
Comenius University Bratislava, F. O. L., & Lengyel, A.
Affiliations
Comenius University Bratislava (SK)
Corresponding author
Lengyel, Alan
Venue
STUDIA IURIDICA Cassoviensia
Published
2025-12-19
Volume
13
Issue
3
ISSN
1339-3995 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7118414988
Cited by
0
References
0
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
STUDIA IURIDICA Casoviensia (publishedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Law › Administrative Law and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Law › Artificial Intelligence in Law
Keywords
automated decision-making, administrative sanctions, AI liability, state liability, EU AI Act, GDPR, transparency, public administration, Czech administrative law

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATIVE PENAL MATTERS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.33542/sic2025-s-07
The paper
Comenius University Bratislava, F. O. L., & Lengyel, A. (2025). AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING IN ADMINISTRATIVE PENAL MATTERS. STUDIA IURIDICA Cassoviensia. https://doi.org/10.33542/sic2025-s-07

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