Becoming Who We Are
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Abstract
This chapter demonstrates that Gilles Deleuze's work on Henri Bergson is not a departure for Deleuze but is rather part of his continuing effort to develop a transcendental empiricism. It first addresses some frequent criticisms of David Hume's theory of belief. It describes Hume's arguments concerning personal identity, and then moves on to the problem of the subject as Deleuze finds it at work in Hume's project. Bergson, Deleuze claims, argues that ‘the virtual must have a consistency, an objective consistency that enables it to differentiate itself’ — that is, to create determinate, novel differences. In addition, Deleuze's use of the term ‘pragmatics’ is explained. Deleuze's move to Bergson after his work on Hume was not a departure at all, for Hume's concern, in both his philosophical and historical writings, was to problematize the actual and thereby allow the creativity and inventiveness of the human species to shine forth.
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Cited by
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Petersen, S. E., & Posner, M. I. (2012) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-062111-150525 · Cited by 3,439
The Neuroscience of Mindfulness Meditation
Tang, Y.-Y., Hölzel, B. K., & Posner, M. I. (2015) · Nature reviews. Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3916 · Cited by 2,889
Posner, M. I. (2012) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.12.040 · Cited by 151
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bell, J. A.
- Venue
- Deleuze's HumePhilosophy, Culture and the Scottish Enlightenment
- Publisher
- Edinburgh University Press
- Published
- 2008-12-16
- Pages
- 34-56
- OpenAlex
- W2485364319
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 3.98
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Becoming Who We Are. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748634392.003.0002
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- Bell, J. A. (2008). Becoming Who We Are. Deleuze's HumePhilosophy, Culture and the Scottish Enlightenment. https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748634392.003.0002
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