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Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability
Open accessAbstract
We study a general equilibrium model in which entrepreneurs finance investment with optimal financial contracts.Because of enforceability problems, contracts are constrained efficient.We show that limited enforceability amplifies the impact of technological innovations on aggregate output.More generally, we show that lower enforceability of contracts will be associated with greater aggregate volatility.A key assumption for this result is that defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market.
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Financial Structure and Economic Growth
(2001) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3001.001.0001 · Cited by 544
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Metadata
- Authors
- Cooley, T., Marimon, R., & Quadrini, V.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2003-12
- OpenAlex
- W3123712895
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 1
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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