The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation
Open accessAbstract
The purpose of this paper is to present the chronological development of the concept of excess burden and the related study of optimal tax theory.A main objective of this exercise is to uncover the interrelationships among various apparently distinct results, so as to bring out the basic structure of the entire problem.The paper includes a discussion of various measures of excess burden, focusing on issues of approximation, informational requirements, aggregation over individuals, and the effects of technology.Included in the presentation of optimal tax theory is a section on tax reform, as well as an application of the theory to the case where uncertainty is present.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Samuelson, P. A. (1954) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925895 · Cited by 7,458
Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case
Merton, R. C. (1969) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1926560 · Cited by 5,187
Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
Pratt, J. W. (1976) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912743 · Cited by 4,654
Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing.
Hakansson, N. H., & Arrow, K. J. (1972) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2978877 · Cited by 3,991
Increasing risk: I. A definition
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1970) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(70)90038-4 · Cited by 3,829
The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation
Atkinson, A. B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1976) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(76)90041-4 · Cited by 1,719
Applied Welfare Economics with Discrete Choice Models
Small, K. A., & Rosen, H. S. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911129 · Cited by 1,188
Gorman, W. M. (1953) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1906943 · Cited by 728
Monopoly and Resource Allocation
Harberger, A. C. (1995) · Essential Readings in Economics · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-24002-9_5 · Cited by 670
Exact Consumer's Surplus and Deadweight Loss
Hausman, J. A. (2008) · American Economic Review · Cited by 657
Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods
Atkinson, A. B., & Stern, N. H. (1974) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296403 · Cited by 617
Optimal taxation and public productionPreprint
Diamond, P. A. (1968) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 479
Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency
Stiglitz, J. E., & Dasgupta, P. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296778 · Cited by 475
The structure of indirect taxation and economic efficiency
Atkinson, A. B., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90021-7 · Cited by 417
Community Preferences and the Representative Consumer
Muellbauer, J. (1976) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911540 · Cited by 381
Taxation, Resource Allocation, and Welfare
Harberger, A. C. (1964) · Role of Direct and Indirect Taxes in the Federal Reserve System · doi:10.1515/9781400875931-003 · Cited by 299
A Note on the Structure of Optimal Taxation
Sandmo, A. (2016) · American Economic Review · Cited by 129
The deadweight loss from a tax system
Kay, J. (1980) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(80)90025-0 · Cited by 113
The Incidence and Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital
Shoven, J. B. (1976) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260511 · Cited by 111
The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and Randomnness in the Optimal Income Tax
Weiss, L. (1976) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260519 · Cited by 108
Applied Welfare Economics with Discrete Choice Models
Rosen, H. S., & Small, K. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0319 · Cited by 68
The Measurement of Deadweight Loss Revisited
Diewert, W. E. (1981) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912752 · Cited by 41
The Measurement of Excess Burden with Explicit Utility Functions
Rosen, H. S. (1978) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260697 · Cited by 35
Cited by
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence
Chetty, R., Looney, A., & Kroft, K. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1145 · Cited by 2,742
Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax
Feldstein, M. (1999) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/003465399558391 · Cited by 816
Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods
Chetty, R. (2009) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev.economics.050708.142910 · Cited by 666
Environmental policy, public finance and the labour market in a second-best world
Bovenberg, A. L., & van der Ploeg, F. (1994) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(93)01398-t · Cited by 383
Chetty, R., Guren, A., Manoli, D., & Weber, A. (2013) · NBER Macroeconomics Annual · doi:10.1086/669170 · Cited by 359
Metadata
- Authors
- Auerbach, A.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1982-11
- OpenAlex
- W2131497938
- Cited by
- 282
- References
- 23
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.