The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Introduction and Summary
Open accessAbstract
Why did the Federal Reserve let Lehman Brothers fail?Fed officials say they lacked the legal authority to rescue the firm, because it did not have adequate collateral to borrow the cash it needed.This paper summarizes a monograph that disputes officials' claims (Ball, 2016).These claims are incorrect in two senses: a perceived lack of legal authority was not why the Fed did not rescue Lehman; and the Fed did in fact have the authority for a rescue.
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Citations
Cites
The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Setting the Record Straight on a Financial Disaster
Ball, L. M. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108355742 · Cited by 201
Self-citation
Cited by
Duca, J. V. (2017) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2017.05.008 · Cited by 14
Central Banking without RomancePreprint
Hogan, D. J. S. T. L., Smith, D. J., & Aguiar-Hicks, R. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2536431 · Cited by 12
Long-term bank lending and the transfer of aggregate risk
Reiter, M., & Zessner-Spitzenberg, L. (2023) · Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control · doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104651 · Cited by 8
Carlson, M. A., & Macchiavelli, M. (2018) · Finance and Economics Discussion Series · doi:10.17016/feds.2018.078 · Cited by 4
A Discussion on Fiscal Policies Implemented in EU During and After the Great Recession
Polat, G. E., & Polat, O. (2019) · Advances in finance, accounting, and economics book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-5225-7564-1.ch009 · Cited by 1
The Credit Council in the US Context
Feldmann, J. D. (2024) · Accounting Economics and Law - A Convivium · doi:10.1515/ael-2023-0134 · Cited by 1
Long-Term Bank Lending and the Transfer of Aggregate RiskPreprint
Reiter, M., & Zessner-Spitzenberg, L. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4188538 · Cited by 1
Macroeconomic Ideas, Business Cycles and Economic Policies: One Size Doesn’t Fit All - A PrimerPreprint
Masciandaro, D. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2529980
Long-Term Bank Lending and the Transfer of Aggregate RiskPreprint
Reiter, M., & Zessner-Spitzenberg, L. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4193928
A Discussion on Fiscal Policies Implemented in EU During and After the Great Recession
Polat, G. E., & Polat, O. (2022) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/978-1-6684-7460-0.ch004
A New Empirical Comparison of Monetary Policy During the Great Depression and Great RecessionPreprint
Olson, E., & Glock, J. E. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5123831
Metadata
- Authors
- Ball, L.
- Affiliations
- International Monetary Fund (US)
- Corresponding author
- Ball, Laurence
- ORCID
- Ball, Laurence
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2016-07
- OpenAlex
- W2500668545
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 3 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- National Bureau of Economic Research (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › finance, banking, and market dynamics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Regulation and Crises
- Keywords
- Federal Reserve, Lehman Brothers, 2008 financial crisis, bank bailout, legal authority, collateral, financial regulation
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
