Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories are Hidden
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Jurisdictions across the United States have adopted "ban the box" (BTB) policies preventing employers from conducting criminal background checks until late in the job application process.Their goal is to improve employment outcomes for those with criminal records, with a secondary goal of reducing racial disparities in employment.However, removing information about job applicants' criminal histories could lead employers who don't want to hire ex-offenders to try to guess who the ex-offenders are, and avoid interviewing them.In particular, employers might avoid interviewing young, low-skilled, black and Hispanic men when criminal records are not observable.This would worsen employment outcomes for these already-disadvantaged groups.In this paper, we use variation in the details and timing of state and local BTB policies to test BTB's effects on employment for various demographic groups.We find that BTB policies decrease the probability of being employed by 3.4 percentage points (5.1%) for young, low-skilled black men, and by 2.3 percentage points (2.9%) for young, low-skilled Hispanic men.These findings support the hypothesis that when an applicant's criminal history is unavailable, employers statistically discriminate against demographic groups that are likely to have a criminal record.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Hainmueller, J. (2012) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpr025 · Cited by 6,026
Pager, D. (2003) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/374403 · Cited by 2,840
Wolff, N., & Shi, J. (2012) · International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health · doi:10.3390/ijerph9051908 · Cited by 252
Cited by
Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: A Field Experiment*
Agan, A., & Starr, S. (2018) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjx028 · Cited by 545
Collateral Consequences of Punishment: A Critical Review and Path Forward
Kirk, D. S., & Wakefield, S. (2018) · Annual Review of Criminology · doi:10.1146/annurev-criminol-032317-092045 · Cited by 346
“…be tested in other jurisdictions, Agan & Starr’s (2017) results suggest that at least for this one reform designed to reduce collateral consequences of a criminal record, the policy may backfire or at least have negative unintended consequences (see also Doleac & Hansen 2016, Vuolo et al. 2017).”
BackgroundRacialized legal status as a social determinant of health
Asad, A. L., & Clair, M. (2018) · Social Science & Medicine · doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.03.010 · Cited by 291
Diversion in the Criminal Justice System
Mueller-Smith, M., & T. Schnepel, K. (2021) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1093/restud/rdaa030 · Cited by 110
Snapping Back: Food Stamp Bans and Criminal Recidivism
Tuttle, C. (2019) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20170490 · Cited by 85
Metadata
- Authors
- Doleac, J., & Hansen, B.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2016-07
- OpenAlex
- W2489441518
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 3
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.