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Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies
Open accessAbstract
We argue here for a broader view of the biases in managers' decisions: In general, managerial rent-seeking affects not only the level of investment, but also the form. Our basic hypothesis is simple: given the now well-established scope for managerial discretion, managers have an incentive to exercise that discretion to enhance their income. Any managerial contract is subject to renegotiation, and a manager's pay is the outcome of an often bewildering bargaining process between management, the board of directors, and rival management teams or takeover artists.
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Akerlof, G., & Akerlof, G. (1991) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.294661 · Cited by 849
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Metadata
- Authors
- Stiglitz, J., & Edlin, A.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1992-08
- OpenAlex
- W1839383423
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 1
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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