The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data
Open accessAbstract
In this paper, we model the determinants of franchise contract terms, namely royalty rates and franchise fees, using a unique panel data set of about 1000 franchisors for the period 1980-1992. We focus on the extent to which firms adjust the terms of their contracts as they become better established, and find that adjustment is relatively infrequent and that firms do not systematically raise or lower their royalty rates or franchise fees when they do adjust them. These results tend to refute a number of existing theories of franchising that are based on risk-sharing, asymmetric information, and certain incentive structures, but support those based on franchisor opportunism and to some extent double-sided moral hazard. Our results also suggest that when industrial organization economists do not have access to panel data, their work may well suffer from the omitted variable bias caused by unobserved firm effects.
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Cites
Hsiao, C. (2014) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139839327 · Cited by 7,869
The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract
Rubin, P. H. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466918 · Cited by 1,005
Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets
Caves, R. E., & II, W. F. M. (1976) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056250 · Cited by 694
Cited by
The Economics of Hybrid Organizations
Ménard, C. (2004) · Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics · doi:10.1628/0932456041960605 · Cited by 1,123
Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence
Lafontaine, F., & Slade, M. (2007) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.45.3.629 · Cited by 711
Self-citationFour formal(izable) theories of the firm?
Gibbons, R. (2005) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2004.09.010 · Cited by 690
Wang, H., Choi, J., & Li, J. (2008) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1070.0271 · Cited by 621
Franchising: A Review and Avenues to Greater Theoretical Diversity
Combs, J. G., Michael, S. C., & Castrogiovanni, G. J. (2004) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1016/j.jm.2004.06.006 · Cited by 450
Metadata
- Authors
- Lafontaine, F., & Shaw, K.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1996-05
- OpenAlex
- W3022515560
- Cited by
- 245
- References
- 3
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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