Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record.
Abstract
We investigate the impact of changes in states' anti-takeover legislation on executive compensation. We find both pay for performance sensitivities and mean pay increase for the firms affected by the legislation (relative to a control group). These findings are partially consistent with an optimal contracting model of CEO pay as well as with a skimming model in which reduced takeover fears allow CEO's to skim more. We compute lower bounds on the relative risk aversion coefficients implied by our findings. These lower bounds are relatively high, indicating that the increase in mean pay may have been more than needed to maintain CEO's individual rationality constraints. Under both models however, our evidence shows that the increased pay for performance offsets some of the incentive reduction caused by lower takeover threats.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Financial accounting information and corporate governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00027-1 · Cited by 2,283
Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.253302 · Cited by 849
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities
Piketty, T., Saez, E., & Stantcheva, S. (2014) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.6.1.230 · Cited by 713
Metadata
- Authors
- Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 1998-12
- OpenAlex
- W1592378061
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 0
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w6830
- The paper
- Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (1998). Executive Compensation and Incentives: The Impact of Takeover Legislation. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w6830
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.