The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan
Open accessAbstract
This study examines the misallocation of credit in Japan associated with the perverse incentives of banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms.Firms are far more likely to receive additional credit if they are in poor financial condition, and these firms continue to perform poorly after receiving additional bank financing.Troubled Japanese banks allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers primarily to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets.This problem is compounded by extensive corporate affiliations, which provide a further incentive for banks to allocate scarce credit based on considerations other than prudent credit risk analysis.
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Cites
The role of banks in reducing the costs of financial distress in Japan
Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., & Scharfstein, D. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90021-q · Cited by 1,213
Do Banking Shocks Affect Borrowing Firm Performance? An Analysis of the Japanese Experience
Kang, J.-K., & Stulz, R. M. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.136708 · Cited by 392
Cited by
Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Khanna, T., & Yafeh, Y. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.787625 · Cited by 256
Metadata
- Authors
- Peek, J., & Rosengren, E.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2003-04
- OpenAlex
- W2058900719
- Cited by
- 258
- References
- 2
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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