Cited by 66Global Security and Public HealthCRISPR and Genetic EngineeringBiomedical Ethics and Regulation

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Next Steps for Access to Safe, Secure DNA Synthesis

Open access
Diggans, James, Leproust, Emily·2019·Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology

Abstract

The DNA synthesis industry has, since the invention of gene-length synthesis, worked proactively to ensure synthesis is carried out securely and safely. Informed by guidance from the U.S. government, several of these companies have collaborated over the last decade to produce a set of best practices for customer and sequence screening prior to manufacture. Taken together, these practices ensure that synthetic DNA is used to advance research that is designed and intended for public benefit. With increasing scale in the industry and expanding capability in the synthetic biology toolset, it is worth revisiting current practices to evaluate additional measures to ensure the continued safety and wide availability of DNA synthesis. Here we encourage specific steps, in part derived from successes in the cybersecurity community, that can ensure synthesis screening systems stay well ahead of emerging challenges, to continue to enable responsible research advances. Gene synthesis companies, science and technology funders, policymakers, and the scientific community as a whole have a shared duty to continue to minimize risk and maximize the safety and security of DNA synthesis to further power world-changing developments in advanced biological manufacturing, agriculture, drug development, healthcare, and energy.

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Crossref · 10.3389/fbioe.2019.00086

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  • Many companies still do not screen DNA synthesis orders.

    “The importance of universal DNA synthesis screening has been well-known since 2006 24 , but many companies still do not screen orders 25 , and screening has not yet been integrated into benchtop synthesizers.”

    From Human innovation and the creative agency of the world in the age of generative AI (2024) · cites this paper as [25]

    The Research Funding Priorities section (‘Democratizing Access to Sequence Screening’; page unavailable) says screening is expensive and that current economics strongly disincentivize it for low-margin or low-volume companies. This supports a gap in screening uptake, but the paper does not establish that many companies do not screen orders. (LLM, conf=0.76)

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Research works printed but not linked: 10

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Metadata

Authors
Diggans, J., & Leproust, E.
Affiliations
Twist Bioscience (United States) (US)
Corresponding author
Diggans, James
Venue
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
Published
2019-04-24
Volume
7
Pages
86-86
ISSN
2296-4185 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2941591629
Cited by
66
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 3
FWCI
13.58
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Global Security and Public Health
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Molecular Biology › CRISPR and Genetic Engineering
  • Health Sciences › Nursing › Issues, ethics and legal aspects › Biomedical Ethics and Regulation
Keywords
DNA synthesis, customer screening, cybersecurity principles, responsible research, biosecurity, best practices

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