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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Mitigating Security Vulnerabilities in 6G Networks: A Comprehensive Analysis of the DMRN Protocol Using SVO Logic and ProVerif

Open access

Abstract

The rapid evolution of mobile and optical communication technologies is driving the transition from 5G to 6G networks. This transition inevitably brings about changes in authentication scenarios, as new security demands emerge that go beyond the capabilities of existing frameworks. Therefore, it is necessary to address these evolving requirements and the associated key challenges: ensuring Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) to protect communications even if long-term keys are compromised and integrating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) techniques to defend against the threats posed by quantum computing. These are essential for both radio and optical communications, which are foundational elements of future 6G infrastructures. The DMRN Protocol, introduced in 2022, represents a major advancement by offering both PFS and PQC while maintaining compatibility with existing 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standards. Given the looming quantum-era challenges, it is imperative to analyze the protocol’s security architecture through formal verification. Accordingly, we formally analyze the DMRN Protocol using SVO logic and ProVerif to assess its effectiveness in mitigating attack vectors, such as malicious or compromised serving networks (SNs) and home network (HN) masquerading. Our research found that the DMRN Protocol has vulnerabilities in key areas such as mutual authentication and key exchange. In light of these findings, our study provides critical insights into the design of secure and quantum-safe authentication protocols for the transition to 6G networks. Furthermore, by identifying the vulnerabilities in and discussing countermeasures to address the DMRN Protocol, this study lays the groundwork for the future standardization of secure 6G Authentication and Key Agreement protocols.

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Crossref · 10.3390/app14219726

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Citations

Cites

Show all 20 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Burrows, 1989, A Logic of Authentication, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. Math. Phys. Eng. Sci., 426, 233
  2. Waidner, 1994, Formal Verification of Authentication Protocols, IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., 11, 749

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
You, I., Kim, J., Pawana, I. W. A. J., & Ko, Y.
Affiliations
  • Kookmin University (KR)
  • Gyeongsang National University (KR)
Corresponding author
Ko, Yongho
Venue
Applied Sciences
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2024-10-24
Volume
14
Issue
21
Pages
9726
ISSN
2076-3417 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4403733819
Cited by
7
References
20
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 6
FWCI
1.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Applied Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) (2022-00207416)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › IPv6, Mobility, Handover, Networks, Security
Keywords
6G, forward secrecy, post-quantum cryptography, mutual authentication, key exchange, formal verification, ProVerif, 3GPP standards, network security vulnerabilities

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.