Chained Anomaly Detection Models for Federated Learning: An Intrusion Detection Case Study
Open accessAbstract
The adoption of machine learning and deep learning is on the rise in the cybersecurity domain where these AI methods help strengthen traditional system monitoring and threat detection solutions. However, adversaries too are becoming more effective in concealing malicious behavior amongst large amounts of benign behavior data. To address the increasing time-to-detection of these stealthy attacks, interconnected and federated learning systems can improve the detection of malicious behavior by joining forces and pooling together monitoring data. The major challenge that we address in this work is that in a federated learning setup, an adversary has many more opportunities to poison one of the local machine learning models with malicious training samples, thereby influencing the outcome of the federated learning and evading detection. We present a solution where contributing parties in federated learning can be held accountable and have their model updates audited. We describe a permissioned blockchain-based federated learning method where incremental updates to an anomaly detection machine learning model are chained together on the distributed ledger. By integrating federated learning with blockchain technology, our solution supports the auditing of machine learning models without the necessity to centralize the training data. Experiments with a realistic intrusion detection use case and an autoencoder for anomaly detection illustrate that the increased complexity caused by blockchain technology has a limited performance impact on the federated learning, varying between 5 and 15%, while providing full transparency over the distributed training process of the neural network. Furthermore, our blockchain-based federated learning solution can be generalized and applied to more sophisticated neural network architectures and other use cases.
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Most research prototypes employ DLT-based federated learning to train relatively simple AI models, and extant research indicates a performance overhead of 5% to 15%.
“Most research prototypes, for example, employ DLT-based federated learning to train relatively simple AI models (Pandl et al. 2020;Preuveneers et al. 2018), while extant research indicates that DLT-based federated learning induces a performance overhead of 5% to 15% (Preuveneers et al. 2018).”
From Trustworthy artificial intelligence (2021) · cites this paper as Preuveneers et al. 2018
Man-in-the-Middle attacks intercept the models exchanged between the clients and the server and replace them with malicious model updates.
“Man-in-the-Middle attacks [84], [85] intercept the models exchanged between the clients and the server and replace them with malicious model updates.”
From Vulnerabilities in federated learning (2021) · cites this paper as [84]
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References 35 · Cited by 323
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- McMahan, B.; Moore, E.; Ramage, D.; Hampson, S.; Arcas, B.A. Communication-Efficient Learning of Deep Networks from Decentralized Data. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, Fort Lauderdale, FL, USA, 20-22 April 2017;
- Dy, J., Krause, A., Eds.; PMLR: Stockholmsmässan, Stockholm, Sweden, 2018; Volume 80, pp. 4393-4402.
- Ryan, J.; Lin, M.J.; Miikkulainen, R. Intrusion Detection with Neural Networks. In Proceedings of the 1997 Conference on Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 10; MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, USA, 1998; pp. 943-949.
- Steinhardt, J.; Koh, P.W.; Liang, P. Certified Defenses for Data Poisoning Attacks. arXiv 2017, arXiv:1706.0369.
- Greenspan, G. Multichain Private Blockchain-White Paper. 2017. Available online: https://arxiv.org/pdf/ 1706.03691.pdf (accessed on 16 December 2018).
- Authors
- Preuveneers, D., Rimmer, V., Tsingenopoulos, I., Spooren, J., Joosen, W., & Ilie-Zudor, E.
- Affiliations
- IMEC (BE)
- MTA SZTAKI, Kende u. 13-17, H-1111 Budapest, Hungary
- Corresponding author
- Preuveneers, Davy
- Venue
- Applied Sciences
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2018-12-18
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 12
- Pages
- 2663
- ISSN
- 2076-3417 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2903872466
- Cited by
- 323
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15 · 2025: 54 · 2024: 68 · 2023: 61 · 2022: 58 · 2021: 40 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 5
- FWCI
- 9.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Applied Sciences (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Lirias (KU Leuven) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- SZTAKI Publication Repository (Hungarian Academy of Sciences) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- H2020 Project EXCELL (691829)
- imec ICON RADIANCE (HBC.2017.0629)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- federated learning, blockchain, anomaly detection, intrusion detection, data poisoning, model auditing, permissioned blockchain, autoencoder, machine learning transparency, cybersecurity
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