Cited by 88Information and Cyber SecurityCybersecurity and Cyber Warfare StudiesNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection

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Cyber Physical Systems Security for Maritime Assets

Open access
Progoulakis, Iosif, Rohmeyer, Paul, Nikitakos, Nikitas·2021·Journal of Marine Science and Engineering

Abstract

The integration of IT, OT, and human factor elements in maritime assets is critical for their efficient and safe operation and performance. This integration defines cyber physical systems and involves a number of IT and OT components, systems, and functions that involve multiple and diverse communication paths that are technologically and operationally evolving along with credible cyber security threats. These cyber security threats and risks as well as a number of known security breach scenarios are described in this paper to highlight the evolution of cyber physical systems in the maritime domain and their emerging cyber vulnerabilities. Current industry and governmental standards and directives related to cyber security in the maritime domain attempt to enforce the regulatory compliance and reinforce asset cyber security integrity for optimum and safe performance with limited focus, however, in the existing OT infrastructure and systems. The use of outside-of-the-maritime industry security risk assessment tools and processes, such the API STD 780 Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and the Bow Tie Analysis methodologies, can assist the asset owner to assess its IT and OT infrastructure for cyber and physical security vulnerabilities and allocate proper mitigation measures assuming their similarities to ICS infrastructure. The application of cyber security controls deriving from the adaptation of the NIST CSF and the MITRE ATT&CK Threat Model can further increase the cyber security integrity of maritime assets, assuming they are periodically evaluated for their effectiveness and applicability. Finally, the improvement in communication among stakeholders, the increase in operational and technical cyber and physical security resiliency, and the increase in operational cyber security awareness would be further increased for maritime assets by the convergence of the distinct physical and cyber security functions as well as onshore- and offshore-based cyber infrastructure of maritime companies and asset owners.

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Crossref · 10.3390/jmse9121384

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  • Current maritime cybersecurity risk assessment is conducted using either qualitative analysis or very traditional quantitative risk analysis methods such as Bow-Tie analysis and risk matrices.

    “The current maritime cybersecurity risk assessment is conducted using either qualitative analysis or very traditional quantitative risk analysis methods such using Bow-Tie analysis (Progoulakis et al., 2021) and risk matrices (Yoo and Park, 2021).”

    From A BN driven FMEA approach to assess maritime cybersecurity risks (2023) · cites this paper as Progoulakis et al., 2021

    Section 5.2 identifies Bow-Tie Analysis as a tool for assessing maritime cyber-physical security risks. But the Research Methodology and Article Structure section describes it as a method from another industry sector that *could be applied* in maritime cybersecurity; the paper does not establish that it is a current, traditional quantitative method used in maritime risk assessment. The risk-matrix citation is to a different source and is not judged here. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Zarzuelo, 2020, Industry 4.0 in the port and maritime industry: A literature review, J. Ind. Inf. Integr., 20, 100173
  2. Svilicic, B., Rudan, I., Jugovic, A., and Zec, D. (2019). A Study on Cyber Security Threats in a Shipboard Integrated Navigational System. J. Mar. Sci. Eng., 7. · DOI
  3. Dahman, J.S., and Baldwin, K.J. (2008, January 7–10). Understanding the current state of US defense systems of systems and the implications for systems engineering. Proceedings of the 2nd Annual IEEE Systems Conference, Montreal, QC, Canada. · DOI
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  5. Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), The Energy Institute (2018). Bow Ties in Risk Management: A Concept Book for Process Safety, John Wiley & Sons Inc.
  6. Ji, 2021, Harmonizing safety and security risk analysis and prevention in cyber-physical systems, Process. Saf. Environ. Prot., 148, 1279, 10.1016/j.psep.2021.03.004 · DOI
  7. Meland, 2019, An experimental evaluation of bow-tie analysis for security, Inf. Comput. Secur., 26, 536, 10.1108/ICS-11-2018-0132 · DOI
  8. Abdo, 2018, A safety/security risk analysis approach of Industrial Control Systems: A cyber bowtie—combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analysis, Comput. Secur., 72, 175, 10.1016/j.cose.2017.09.004 · DOI
  9. Lecture Notes in Computer, Science, Liu, P., Mauw, S., and Stolen, K. (2018). Visualizing Cyber Security Risks with Bow-Tie Diagrams. Graphical Models for Security, GraMSec 2017, Springer.
  10. Georgiadou, A., Mouzakitis, S., and Askounis, D. (2021). Assessing MITRE ATT&CK Risk Using a Cyber-Security Culture Framework. Sensors, 21. · DOI

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Metadata

Authors
Progoulakis, I., Rohmeyer, P., & Nikitakos, N.
Affiliations
  • University of the Aegean (GR)
  • Stevens Institute of Technology (US)
Corresponding author
Progoulakis, Iosif
Venue
Journal of Marine Science and Engineering
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2021-12-05
Volume
9
Issue
12
Pages
1384
ISSN
2077-1312 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4200009490
Cited by
88
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 17 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 6
FWCI
8.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Marine Science and Engineering (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
cyber-physical systems, cybersecurity, industrial control systems, security risk assessment, bow-tie analysis, NIST CSF, MITRE ATT&CK, security countermeasures, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, security resilience, cybersecurity awareness

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