The DOI matches its Crossref record; the references it cites are not checked yet.
Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence
Open accessAbstract
I defend a diachronic constraint on justification as a necessary condition for knowledge. In my view (JTB + D), a belief is knowledge-apt only if its justification is maintainable over a context-sensitive interval Δ under ordinary avenues of evidence-accrual, including reliable memory, testimony, and communal inquiry, with no accessible undefeated defeaters arising within that interval. This temporal, process-sensitive requirement mitigates Gettier-style luck by targeting “snapshot” justification that would easily collapse under minimal further scrutiny (as in Fake Barn County), while avoiding infallibilism and over-intellectualism. I calibrate Δ by stakes and domain volatility to avoid vagueness and moving goalposts, distinguish responsive stability from mere habituation, and show how the account handles no-new-evidence scenarios without undermining ordinary memorial and testimonial knowledge. Conceptually, the proposal integrates internalist and externalist insights as it preserves reason-responsiveness over time and serves as an actual-world temporal analogue of safety, not a standalone fourth ‘dimension’. I engage canonical cases and acknowledge Zagzebski’s challenge: the view does not promise full Gettier immunity, but it raises the bar for counterexamples in ordinary environments. The result is a principled, parameterised refinement of the justification condition that better captures knowledge as an enduring, responsibly supported true belief.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“A claim may be true and yet unwarranted for the person asserting it, if they cannot trace the path by which it was justified”
From Hallucination as epistemic pollution: epistemic injustice and credibility in futures-oriented science education (2026) · cites this paper as [23]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“the machinery of justification is precisely what a generative system withholds even when its output happens to be correct [23].”
From Hallucination as epistemic pollution: epistemic injustice and credibility in futures-oriented science education (2026) · cites this paper as [23]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
The citation lists are queued
They are fetched later and appear here then.
References 24 · Cited by 2
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical Explanations, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Chisholm, R.M. (1977). Theory of knowledge, Prentice Hall. [2nd ed.].
- Swain, 1974, Epistemic Defeasibility, Am. Philos. Q., 11, 15
- Sosa, E. (2007). A Virtue Epistemology, Oxford University Press. · DOI · Paper page
Metadata
- Authors
- Küçükuncular, A.
- Affiliations
- Near East University (CY)
- Corresponding author
- Küçükuncular, Ahmet
- ORCID
- Küçükuncular, Ahmet
- Venue
- Philosophies
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2025-11-18
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 126
- ISSN
- 2409-9287 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4416337051
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 24
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2
- FWCI
- 15.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Philosophies (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Keywords
- justified true belief, knowledge, Gettier problem, epistemic justification, infallibilism, memory, witness testimony, internalism and externalism
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/philosophies10060126
- The paper
- Küçükuncular, A. (2025). Justified True Belief + Diachronic Justification: A Contemporary Defence. Philosophies. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies10060126
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.