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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 45 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Weaponised interdependence and European energy security: Infrastructure, systemic vulnerability, and the post-2022 transformation

Open access
Badalov, Elmir·2026·Security and Defence Quarterly

Abstract

This article extends a concept developed by Farrell and Newman (2019) beyond its original financial and digital domains to physical energy infrastructure, examining how the Russia–Ukraine war has transformed European energy security from a market-based relationship into a condition of systemic vulnerability. The analysis employs qualitative document analysis of publicly available European Union’s policy instruments, International Energy Agency’s market reports, and European Union Agency for Cybersecurity’s threat assessments, structured around a three-domain framework encompassing physical infrastructure, digital systems, and governance arrangements. Diversification strategies implemented after 2022 reduced dependence on Russian energy but simultaneously reconfigured systemic vulnerability across all three domains: liquified natural gas (LNG) import concentration and deployment of floating storage and regasification units created new physical chokepoints; supervisory control and data acquisition and digital vendor dependencies introduced persistent digital interdependencies; and governance fragmentation among member states amplified vulnerability by producing uneven resilience across interconnected systems. European energy security must be reconceptualised as the management of systemic interdependence across interconnected physical, digital, and institutional domains. The article introduces the concept of structural weaponisation potential—the proposition that networked energy systems generate vulnerability as an emergent property of their architecture, independent of any actor’s intention to exploit it.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The article extends Farrell and Newman’s weaponised interdependence framework to European energy infrastructure, arguing that post-2022 diversification reduced Russian energy dependence but reconfigured systemic vulnerability across physical, digital, and governance domains. It introduces “structural weaponisation potential”—vulnerability as an emergent property of networked energy architecture, independent of any actor’s intention to exploit it.

Key findings

  • Pre-2022, Russia supplied roughly 40% of EU gas imports (≈155 bcm in 2021) through pipeline capacity exceeding 150 bcm/year, supported by 20–30-year take-or-pay contracts; the liberal market framing systematically underestimated structural risk.
  • Post-2022 physical reconfiguration: Russian pipeline exports fell to ≈27 bcm in 2023 (a reduction exceeding 82%); LNG imports rose from ≈80 bcm in 2021 to >130 bcm in 2023, with the US accounting for ≈47% of EU LNG supply; FSRUs were commissioned at Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbüttel, and Lubmin, while new chokepoints emerged at US export terminals, FSRU berths, and Hormuz–Panama transit routes.
  • Digital and governance vulnerabilities persisted: the SCADA/industrial control market is dominated by Siemens, ABB, Schneider Electric, and Honeywell; the 2022 Deutsche Windtechnik attack disabled remote monitoring of ≈2,000 wind turbines; Ivanti-related incidents hit Norway in 2023; Sandworm campaigns targeted Ukrainian grids in 2022–2023; ≈€651 bn in national fiscal shields was allocated/earmarked from September 2021 to mid-2023, with Germany >€200 bn (€264 bn total) and allocations ranging from >7% of GDP to <1%; NIS2 transposition was uneven at the October 2024 deadline.
  • Critical minerals create an emerging dependency: the EU imports >98% of rare earth elements, 93% of magnesium, and 97% of borates; China processes ≈85% of global REEs and supplies ≈97% of EU solar panel imports; the IEA projects lithium demand rising by a factor of 40 and cobalt by a factor of 20 by 2040 under a net-zero scenario.

Methods

  • Qualitative document analysis of publicly available EU policy instruments, IEA market reports, ENISA threat assessments, and Scopus/Web of Science scholarly literature, structured by a three-domain framework (physical infrastructure, digital systems, governance) and Bowen’s (2009) skimming, close reading, and interpretive coding procedure.
  • Timeframe 2014–early 2025; each domain was examined through three questions: latent pre-2022 vulnerability, chokepoint/panopticon activation during the crisis, and post-2022 reconfiguration; cross-domain passages were logged separately.
  • The approach is interpretive rather than explanatory; no primary fieldwork or quantitative network analysis was conducted.

Limitations

  • Stated: reliance on publicly available documents excludes informal negotiation dynamics; the EU-as-collective-actor framing simplifies significant member-state variation; the 2014–early 2025 timeframe captures the acute crisis and immediate institutional response but not longer-term structural adjustments still underway.
  • Stated: no primary fieldwork was conducted; quantitative network analysis of energy infrastructure topologies would provide valuable empirical grounding; future research should trace renewables/critical minerals and digital-domain vulnerabilities.
  • Evident from text: the analysis is interpretive and does not measure causal weights across domains; EU-level aggregation may obscure national differences beyond those noted.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.35467/sdq/226337

Cites

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Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Show all 11 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Emmerson C. and Stevens P. (2012) Maritime choke points and the global energy system: Charting a way forward. Briefing paper EERG BP 2012/01. London: Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs.
  2. European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2009a) Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L 211, 14 August 2009, pp. 55–93.
  3. European Parliament and Council of the European Union (2009b) Directive 2009/73/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L 211, 14 August 2009, pp. 94–136.
  4. Goldthau A. and Sitter N. (2022) ‘Whither the liberal European Union energy model? The public policy consequences of Russia’s weaponization of energy’, EconPol Forum, 23(6), pp. 4–7. RePEc:ces:epofor:v:23:y:2022:i:06:p:4-7.

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Metadata

Authors
Badalov, E.
Affiliations
Khazar University (AZ)
Corresponding author
Badalov, Elmir
Venue
Security and Defence Quarterly
Published
2026-08-28
ISSN
  • 2300-8741 (ISSN-L)
  • 2544-994X
OpenAlex
W7212085929
Cited by
0
References
11
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by-nc-nd
Locations
Security and Defence Quarterly (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Energy › General Energy › Global Energy Security and Policy
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › European Politics and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
Keywords
European energy security, systemic vulnerability, Russian invasion of Ukraine, energy diversification, energy infrastructure, energy resilience

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Weaponised interdependence and European energy security: Infrastructure, systemic vulnerability, and the post-2022 transformation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.35467/sdq/226337
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Badalov, E. (2026). Weaponised interdependence and European energy security: Infrastructure, systemic vulnerability, and the post-2022 transformation. Security and Defence Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.35467/sdq/226337

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