Cited by 1Indigenous Peoples' Rights and LawAmerican Constitutional Law and PoliticsJudicial and Constitutional Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 86 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Revising the Indian Plenary Power Doctrine

Open access
Ishtani, M., Fay, Alexandra·2024·Michigan Journal of Race & Law

Abstract

The federal Indian law doctrine of Congressional plenary power is long overdue for an overhaul. Since its troubling nineteenth-century origins in Kagama v. United States (1886), plenary power has justified invasive Congressional interventions and undermined Tribal sovereignty. The doctrine's legal basis remains a constitutional conundrum. This Article considers the Court's recent engagement with plenary power in Haaland v. Brackeen (2023). It argues that the Brackeen opinions may signal judicial readiness to reevaluate the doctrine. The Article takes ahold of Justice Gorsuch's critical assessment and runs with it, ultimately proposing a method for cleaning up this destructive and constitutionally dubious line of caselaw.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This Article argues that the Indian plenary power doctrine is constitutionally dubious and that *Haaland v. Brackeen* (2023) signals judicial openness to reconsidering it, especially through Justice Gorsuch’s originalist concurrence. It proposes a screening method for identifying suspect plenary power precedents based on interference with Tribal self-government, facilitation of state encroachment, and reliance on racist reasoning.

Key findings

  • The *Brackeen* majority upheld ICWA while subtly revising plenary power: it rooted congressional authority in constitutional sources and the trust relationship, said Congress’s power “is not absolute,” and omitted *United States v. Kagama* from its major string cites.
  • Justices Thomas and Alito dissented in ways that challenged the doctrine: Thomas said he had “searched in vain” for a constitutional basis for plenary power and called *Kagama* “lack[ing] any constitutional basis”; Alito criticized the majority’s “plenary but not absolute” formulation as logically incoherent.
  • Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence rejected any founding-era “plenary federal authority over Tribes,” describing instead an “Indian-law bargain” in which the federal government has limited enumerated powers over external relations while Tribes retain exclusive internal self-government.
  • The authors propose treating every case relying on *Kagama*, *Lone Wolf*, or plenary power as suspect; an initial Westlaw search found 82 Supreme Court cases citing *Kagama* and 45 citing *Lone Wolf*, with 16 citing both, leaving “some 111 potentially suspect Supreme Court cases.” They add two Gorsuch-derived criteria—whether the act interferes with Tribal self-government or projects state authority into Tribal affairs—plus racist reasoning as an additional red flag.

Methods

  • Doctrinal and historical legal analysis of federal Indian law, centered on *Haaland v. Brackeen* and the plenary power line of cases from *Kagama* and *Lone Wolf*.
  • The authors review the *Brackeen* majority, dissents, and Gorsuch concurrence, then outline a proposed framework for sorting suspect precedents using two criteria distilled from Gorsuch’s originalist account and a heuristic flagging racist tropes.
  • They illustrate the framework with selected cases such as *Kagama*, *Lone Wolf*, *Mazurie*, *Lara*, *Negonsott*, *Seber*, and *Mancari*, and mention an initial Westlaw count of potentially suspect Supreme Court cases.

Limitations

  • The authors state that cataloging and evaluating every suspect case is beyond the Article’s scope, that the initial class of cases is “overly broad,” and that the project does not pretend to fix all of federal Indian law.
  • They note the initial study will not capture statutes never directly challenged in the Supreme Court, such as termination acts, the General Allotment Act, and Public Law 280, nor judge-made law unconnected to congressional action, such as *Oliphant*, *Montana*, and *Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta*.
  • The text also makes evident that the proposal is preliminary and programmatic, that the authors speculate about the *Brackeen* majority’s intentions, and that the criteria are not empirically tested or exhaustively applied.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.36643/mjrl.29.1.revising

Cites

6 of 6 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

81 Sources not found · 62 Own interpretation · 11 Not checked yet · 4 No basis given · 1 Own result

Show all 78 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 34
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 55
81 of 81
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The Supreme Court's elision of Kagama in Brackeen was intentional rather than accidental.

    “We can only speculate as to the actual intentions of Justice Barrett and the discussions that led to her choice of authorities.However, considering Justice Gorsuch's extensive engagement with the doctrine's genealogy and his singling out of Ka_l?ama, it seems likely that the elision was no mere accident.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A Supreme Court decision repudiating the constitutionality of plenary power would not mean utter destruction for federal Indian policy.

    “Finally, implicit to this entire project is the assurance that should the Supreme Court find the courage to admit it was wrong and repudiate the constitutionality of the doctrine, such a decision would not mean utter destruction for federal Indian policy.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The Constitution's original design is the proper standard for evaluating Congressional power over Indian affairs.

    “It then applies two criteria to screen these cases, distilled from Justice Gorsuch's originalist conception of Congressional power.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    The proposed two criteria distilled from Justice Gorsuch's originalist conception can screen cases for legislative overreach.

    “It then applies two criteria to screen these cases, distilled from Justice Gorsuch's originalist conception of Congressional power.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    A reformed, workable, constitutional account of federal power over Tribal nations can be rescued from the troubled history of federal Indian law.

    “Rather, we tentatively suggest that a reformed, workable, constitutional account of federal power over Tribal nations can be rescued from the troubled history of federal Indian law.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Tribes have not disappeared.

    “To state the obvious: Tribes have not disappeared.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Racist assumptions in judicial reasoning can mask the absence of rigorous constitutional analysis and compromise otherwise sound logic because the underlying assumptions are false.

    “We do mean to suggest that racist assumptions in judicial reasoning can (a) mask the absence of rigorous constitutional analysis, and (b) compromise otherwise sound logic because the underlying assumptions are false.”
7 of 7

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

1 of 1

Citations

Cites

Show all 6 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
  2. see, e.g., United States v. Vaello Madero, 596 U.S. 159, 180 (2022) (
  3. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins ef Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1, 7 (2002) ( describing the Indian plenary power origins of the Curtiss-Wright doctrine). 18. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85 ("The power of the general government over [the Tribes] ... must exist in th

Metadata

Authors
Ishtani, M., & Fay, A.
Affiliations
University of California, Los Angeles (US)
Corresponding author
Ishtani, M.
Venue
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
Published
2024
Issue
29.1
Pages
1
ISSN
  • 1095-2721 (ISSN-L)
  • 2688-5492
OpenAlex
W4394773762
Cited by
1
References
6
Citations by year
2025: 1
FWCI
2.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Michigan Journal of Race & Law (publishedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • eYLS (Yale Law School) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Law
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › American Constitutional Law and Politics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Judicial and Constitutional Studies
Keywords
plenary powers, federal Indian law, tribal sovereignty, tribal self-determination

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Revising the Indian Plenary Power Doctrine. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.36643/mjrl.29.1.revising
The paper
Ishtani, M., & Fay, A. (2024). Revising the Indian Plenary Power Doctrine. Michigan Journal of Race & Law. https://doi.org/10.36643/mjrl.29.1.revising