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Digital Market Perfection
Abstract
Google’s, Apple’s, and other companies’ automated assistants are increasingly serving as personal shoppers. These digital intermediaries will save us time by purchasing grocery items, transferring bank accounts, and subscribing to cable. The literature has only begun to hint at the paradigm shift needed to navigate the legal risks and rewards of this coming era of automated commerce. This Article begins to fill that gap by surveying legal battles related to contract exit, data access, and deception that will determine the extent to which automated assistants are able to help consumers to search and switch, potentially bringing tremendous societal benefits. Whereas observers have largely focused on protecting consumers and sellers from digital intermediaries’ market power, sellers like Amazon, Comcast, and Wells Fargo can also harm consumers by obstructing automated assistants. Advancing consumer welfare in the automated era requires not just consumer protection, but digital intermediary protection. The Article also shows the unpredictable side of eliminating switching costs. If digital assistants become pervasive, they could gain the ability to rapidly direct millions of consumers to new purchases whenever a lower price or new innovation becomes available. Significantly accelerated consumer switching—what I call hyperswitching—does not inevitably harm society. But in the extreme it could make some large markets more volatile, raising unemployment costs or financial stability concerns as more firms fail. This new kind of disruption could pose challenges for commercial and banking regulators akin to those familiar to securities regulators, who deploy idiosyncratic tools such as a pause button for the stock market. Even if sellers prevent extreme hyperswitching, managers may strategically prepare for hyperswitching with economically costly behavior such as hoarding liquid assets or forming conglomerates to provide insurance against a sudden exodus of customers. The transaction-cost-focused literature has missed macro-level drawbacks. The regulatory architecture reflects these scholarly gaps. One set of agencies regulates automated assistants for consumer protection and antitrust violations but does not go beyond those microeconomic inquiries. Nor do they prioritize strengthening digital intermediaries. Regulators with more macroeconomic missions lack jurisdiction over automated assistants. The intellectual framework and regulatory architecture should expand to encompass both the upsides and downsides of digital consumer sovereignty.
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“Indeed, there are many societal processes ranging from the mundane to the critical - that function only because of physical limits on the number and capability of humans (e.g., Van Loo, 2019, see also the examples in Section 2.2).”
From Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI (2025) · cites this paper as Van Loo, 2019
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- U.S.C. § 5321(b) (2012). 355. Various scholars have proposed a new technology-focused regulator. See Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, supra note 5 (proposing a technology meta-regulator and men- tioning others who have made related proposals for robotics and search commissions). 356. Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 72, 73 (1998) ("Mainstream economics . . . is in fact little concerned with what happens in the real world."). 357. See supra Section II.A.
Cited by
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Hammond, L., Chan, A., Clifton, J., Hoelscher-Obermaier, J., Khan, A., McLean, E., Smith, C., Barfuss, W., Foerster, J., Gavenčiak, T., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.14143 · Cited by 305
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- Van Loo, R.
- Affiliations
- Boston University School of Law
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- Michigan Law Review
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- University of Michigan Law Library
- Published
- 2019
- Issue
- 117.5
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- 815
- ISSN
- 1939-8557
- 0026-2234
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