Cited by 35Aviation Industry Analysis and TrendsMerger and Competition AnalysisTransport and Economic Policies

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Determinants of Airport–Airline Vertical Arrangements: Analytical Results and Empirical Evidence

Yang, Hangjun, Zhang, Anming, Fu, Xiaowen·2015·Journal of Transport Economics and Policy

Abstract

Many airports are making various vertical arrangements with their airline customers. This paper investigates the effects of such industry practices by analysing airport revenue sharing in a bargaining game. Our results suggest that, generally, airport–airline vertical arrangements are more likely to be formed when airlines have greater market power or higher costs, airport charges are higher, or the airport cares more about social welfare. Preliminary empirical tests confirm that public airports are more likely to form vertical arrangements, but other analytical results do not appear to be directly supported. Relevant policy implications and avenues for future research are provided.

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Crossref · 10.3828/jtep.2015.49.3.438

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  • It is difficult to control the effects of factors beyond managerial controls, such as geographic locations of hubs, regulations, airport slot control, government assistance, emission control policy, and airport-airline vertical arrangements.

    “It is also difficult to control the effects of factors beyond managerial controls, such as geographic locations of an airline's hubs, regulations such as open-skies policy, airport slot control, government assistance including subsidies received during the COVID-19 pandemic, emission control policy, airport-airline vertical arrangements ( Cui et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2011b; Yang et al., 2015 ).”

    From Status quo and challenges in air transport management research (2024) · cites this paper as Yang et al., 2015

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  • Status quo and challenges in air transport management research

    Wandelt, S., Antoniou, C., Birolini, S., Delahaye, D., Dresner, M., Fu, X., Gössling, S., Hong, S.-J., Odoni, A. R., Zanin, M., et al. (2024) · Journal of the Air Transport Research Society · doi:10.1016/j.jatrs.2024.100014 · Cited by 67

    “…locations of an airline’s hubs, regulations such as open-skies policy, airport slot control, government assistance including subsidies received during the COVID-19 pandemic, emission control policy, airport-airline vertical arrangements ( Cui et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2011b; Yang et al., 2015 ).”
    BackgroundSelf-citation

Metadata

Authors
Yang, H., Zhang, A., & Fu, X.
Affiliations
  • University of International Business and Economics (CN)
  • University of British Columbia (CA)
  • The University of Sydney (AU)
Venue
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy
Published
2015-07-01
Volume
49
Issue
3
Pages
438-453
ISSN
  • 0022-5258 (ISSN-L)
  • 1754-5951
OpenAlex
W2307388748
Cited by
35
References
0
Citations by year
2025: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 1
FWCI
10.90
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (publishedVersion)
  • Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (submittedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Aviation Industry Analysis and Trends
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Transportation › Transport and Economic Policies
Keywords
bargaining game, market power, airport charges, social welfare (welfare economics), public airports, airline industry

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