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On the matrix code of quadratic relationships for a Goppa code
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In this article, we continue the analysis started in [8] for the matrix code of quadratic relationships associated with a Goppa code. We provide new sparse and low-rank elements in the matrix code and categorize them according to their shape. Thanks to this description, we prove that the set of rank 2 matrices in the matrix codes associated with square-free binary Goppa codes, i.e. those used in the Classic McEiece cryptosystem, is much larger than what is expected, at least in the case where the Goppa polynomial degree is 2. We build upon the algebraic determinantal modeling introduced in [8] to derive a structural attack on these instances. Our method can break in just a few seconds some recent challenges to recover the key of the McEliece cryptosystem, consistently reducing their estimated security level. We also provide a general method, valid for any Goppa polynomial degree, to transform a generic pair of support and multiplier into a pair of support and Goppa polynomial.
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“During the fourth round, there has been significant progress in cryptanalysis techniques that are applicable to key recovery and the related problem of distinguishing a Goppa code from a random linear code [46, 66-69].”
From Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process (2025) · cites this paper as [69]
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“Nonetheless, algebraic attacks that target the structure of Goppa codes and achieve either key recovery or a distinguisher from a random linear code have remained an active area of research [46, 65-69].”
From Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process (2025) · cites this paper as [69]
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On insecurity of cryptosystems based on generalized Reed-Solomon codes
SIDELNIKOV, V. M., & SHESTAKOV, S. O. (1992) · Discrete Mathematics and Applications · doi:10.1515/dma.1992.2.4.439 · Cited by 235
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Research works printed but not linked: 28
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Status report on the fourth round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process
Alagic, G., Bros, M., Ciadoux, P., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., et al. (2025) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8545 · Cited by 211
Metadata
- Authors
- Mora, R.
- Corresponding author
- Mora, Rocco
- ORCID
- Mora, Rocco
- Venue
- Advances in Mathematics of Communications
- Published
- 2025
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 829-852
- ISSN
- 1930-5338 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-5346
- OpenAlex
- W4399785204
- Cited by
- 3
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3
- FWCI
- 0.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- Locations
- Advances in Mathematics of Communications (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Keywords
- Goppa codes, McEliece cryptosystem, structural attacks, key recovery, binary Goppa codes, code-based cryptography
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