The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents
Abstract
"An extraordinarily good synthesis from an amazing range of philosophical, legal, and technological sources . . . the book will appeal to legal academics and students, lawyers involved in e-commerce and cyberspace legal issues, technologists, moral philosophers, and intelligent lay readers interested in high tech issues, privacy, [and] robotics." —Kevin Ashley, University of Pittsburgh School of Law As corporations and government agencies replace human employees with online customer service and automated phone systems, we become accustomed to doing business with nonhuman agents. If artificial intelligence (AI) technology advances as today's leading researchers predict, these agents may soon function with such limited human input that they appear to act independently. When they achieve that level of autonomy, what legal status should they have? Samir Chopra and Laurence F. White present a carefully reasoned discussion of how existing philosophy and legal theory can accommodate increasingly sophisticated AI technology. Arguing for the legal personhood of an artificial agent, the authors discuss what it means to say it has "knowledge" and the ability to make a decision. They consider key questions such as who must take responsibility for an agent's actions, whom the agent serves, and whether it could face a conflict of interest.
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Citations
Cites
Intelligent agents: theory and practice
Wooldridge, M., & Jennings, N. R. (1995) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888900008122 · Cited by 6,810
Cited by
Governance by algorithms: reality construction by algorithmic selection on the Internet
Just, N., & Latzer, M. (2017) · Media, Culture & Society · doi:10.1177/0163443716643157 · Cited by 612
Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double Standard?
Zerilli, J., Knott, A., Maclaurin, J., & Gavaghan, C. (2019) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-018-0330-6 · Cited by 420
“Crucially, these same considerations apply to deep learning and other B opaque ^ decision tools (Chopra and White 2011, Ch. 1).”
BackgroundMulti-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Hammond, L., Chan, A., Clifton, J., Hoelscher-Obermaier, J., Khan, A., McLean, E., Smith, C., Barfuss, W., Foerster, J., Gavenčiak, T., et al. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2502.14143 · Cited by 305
Collecting the Public Perception of AI and Robot Rights
Lima, G., Kim, C., Ryu, S., Jeon, C., & Cha, M. (2020) · Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction · doi:10.1145/3415206 · Cited by 95
“divisible: some entities have certain rights that others do not [9]. Legal persons may be independent (e.g., humans) or dependent (e.g., corporations) based on how they interact with the legal system [14]. Even though natural persons are entitled rights from their conception, the legal personhood concept is not exclus…”
BackgroundAI Systems Under Criminal Law: a Legal Analysis and a Regulatory Perspective
Lagioia, F., & Sartor, G. (2020) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-019-00362-x · Cited by 75
Mocanu, D. M. (2022) · Frontiers in Robotics and AI · doi:10.3389/frobt.2021.788179 · Cited by 27
Bruin, R. D. (2016) · European Journal of Risk Regulation · doi:10.1017/s1867299x00006036 · Cited by 26
In support of “no-fault” civil liability rules for artificial intelligence
Marchisio, E. (2021) · SN Social Sciences · doi:10.1007/s43545-020-00043-z · Cited by 25
From Galatea 2.2 to Watson – And Back?
Hildebrandt, M. (2013) · Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6314-2_2 · Cited by 10
Goodyear, M. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5184405 · Cited by 2
L'acte administratif algorithmique
Stepanov, A. (2026) · doi:10.70675/adc05be3za62ez4b4fz81e7zabf744e60dbf
Metadata
- Authors
- Chopra, S., & White, L. F.
- Venue
- University of Michigan Press eBooks
- Publisher
- University of Michigan Press
- Published
- 2011
- OpenAlex
- W653546271
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 9.00
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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