Intelligent Transportation System Security: Hacked Message Signs
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
“It cannot happen to us” is one of many common myths regarding cybersecurity in the transportation industry. The traditional view that the threats to transportation are low probability and low impact keep agencies from mitigating security threats to transportation critical infrastructure. Current transportation systems depend on closed proprietary systems, which are enhanced by connected cyber-physical systems. Variable Message Signs (VMS) deliver advisory information to road users to ensure safe and efficient trips. Since the first VMS physical hacking more than a decade ago, the importance of VMS security has been a pressing one. VMS hacks can include physical and remote breaches due to the weak protection of the signs and cyber-physical systems. In 2014, multiple cyber-attacks on signs by “Sun Hacker” pushed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which includes the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to investigate breaches more seriously. It is known that hackers breach cyber systems daily, but white hat hackers have given transportation officials information to help them rethink Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) infrastructure security gaps to prevent harm to road users and financial losses. This study employs a risk-based approach to conducting a threat assessment. This threat assessment performs a qualitative vulnerability-oriented threat analysis. The objective is to investigate safety, security, reliability, and operation issues that are triggered by compromised VMS. Additionally, countermeasures are proposed to prevent the failure of critical infrastructure. The outcome is anticipated to be of special interest and usefulness to policymakers and engineers concerned with the potential vulnerabilities of the ITS’s infrastructure.
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Citations
Cites
Inferring transportation modes from GPS trajectories using a convolutional neural network
Dabiri, S., & Heaslip, K. (2018) · Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies · doi:10.1016/j.trc.2017.11.021 · Cited by 405
Self-citation
Cited by
Explainable Artificial Intelligence Applications in Cyber Security: State-of-the-Art in Research
Zhang, Z., Hamadi, H. A., Damiani, E., Yeun, C. Y., & Taher, F. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3204051 · Cited by 450
Security and Privacy Issues in Intelligent Transportation Systems: Classification and Challenges
Hahn, D., Munir, A., & Behzadan, V. (2021) · IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine · doi:10.1109/mits.2019.2898973 · Cited by 183
An Architecture for IoT-Enabled Smart Transportation Security System: A Geospatial Approach
Zhang, J., Wang, Y., Li, S., & Shi, S. (2021) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3041386 · Cited by 79
Metadata
- Authors
- Kelarestaghi, K. B., Heaslip, K., Khalilikhah, M., Fuentes, A., & Fessmann, V.
- Venue
- SAE International Journal of Transportation Cybersecurity and Privacy
- Publisher
- SAE International
- Published
- 2018-06-18
- Volume
- 01
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 75-90
- ISSN
- 2572-1046 (ISSN-L)
- 2572-1054
- OpenAlex
- W2810911785
- Cited by
- 42
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- The paper
- Kelarestaghi, K. B., Heaslip, K., Khalilikhah, M., Fuentes, A., & Fessmann, V. (2018). Intelligent Transportation System Security: Hacked Message Signs. SAE International Journal of Transportation Cybersecurity and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.4271/11-01-02-0004
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