The DOI matches its Crossref record.
A Risk-Assessment Model for Cyber Attacks on Information Systems
Abstract
Abstract –Industrial process-plants are an integral part of a nation’s economy and critical infrastructure. The information systems used by automated industrial plants are enticing targets of cyber attacks. However, the financial damages resulting from these cyber attacks are difficult to estimate since the resultant losses are not as tangible as physical losses. In this paper, we propose a mathematical model for determining the financial losses resulting from cyber attacks on a computer-based information system used in industrial plants. Limited work has been published to systematically explore the types of possible cyber attacks and their financial impact on the process. The primary objective of this research is to propose a risk-assessment model to assess the impact of cyber attacks on a plant that runs fully or partially by control systems such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). Managers could use the model for cost/benefit analysis of security software and hardware acquisition. We also illustrate this model’s use on a SCADA system using a case. The proposed model could be applied to different industries and organizations with minor modifications to reflect the specifics of that industry or organization. Index Terms–Cyber attacks, computer security, risk assessment, control systems, information systems. I.
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Only in two papers, McQueen et al. (2006) and Patel and Zaveri (2010), it is explicitly mentioned that the method was applied to a real system.
“Only in two papers, namely McQueen et al. (2006) and Patel and Zaveri (2010), it is explicitly mentioned that the method was applied to a real system.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Patel and Zaveri (2010)
Even in the small number of the papers where tool support is discussed, the information regarding a tool is extremely scarce and most often is simply limited to the statement that a tool was developed.
“Even in the small number of the papers where tool support is discussed, the information regarding a tool is extremely scarce and most often is simply limited to the statement that a tool was developed (e.g. in Patel and Zaveri, 2010; Ten et al., 2010).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Patel and Zaveri, 2010
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A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems
Cherdantseva, Y., Burnap, P., Blyth, A., Eden, P., Jones, K., Soulsby, H., & Stoddart, K. (2016) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2015.09.009 · Cited by 606
Review of security issues in industrial networks
Cheminod, M., Durante, L., & Valenzano, A. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2012.2198666 · Cited by 349
Metadata
- Authors
- Patel, S., & Zaveri, J.
- Affiliations
- Morgan State University (US)
- ORCID
- Zaveri, Jigish
- Venue
- Journal of Computers
- Published
- 2010-03-01
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- ISSN
- 1796-203X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2130006997
- Cited by
- 41
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 2 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 6.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Computers (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Keywords
- financial loss estimation, industrial process plants, SCADA systems, industrial control systems, critical infrastructure security, computer-based information systems
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