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Conceptual and Procedural Knowledge
Abstract
Abstract : According to a common folk model, students learn arithmetic by understanding the teacher's explanation of it. This folk model suggests that other, more complicated procedural skills are also acquired by being told. The evidence presented herein suggests that learning-by-being-told is an inaccurate model of the kind of arithmetic learning that actually occurs in classrooms. Rather, arithmetic is learned by induction: the generalization and integration of examples. Contents: 1) Schematic vs. teleological knowledge; 2) Three ways that arithmetic could be learned; 3) The conservative evaluation of the induction hypothesis; 4) A liberal evaluation of the induction hypothesis; 5) Learning by analogy; 6) Learning by being told; 7) Summary; 8) Concluding remarks; 9) Appendix.
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Cited by
Self‐Explanations: How Students Study and Use Examples in Learning to Solve Problems
Chi, M. T. H., Bassok, M., Lewis, M. W., Reimann, P., & Glaser, R. (1989) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog1302_1 · Cited by 1,714
Decision making and the avoidance of cognitive demand
Kool, W., McGuire, J. T., Rosen, Z. B., & Botvinick, M. M. (2010) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0020198 · Cited by 1,141
The functions of multiple representations
Ainsworth, S. (1999) · Computers & Education · doi:10.1016/s0360-1315(99)00029-9 · Cited by 1,122
Learning from worked-out examples: A study on individual differences
RENKL, A. (1997) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1016/s0364-0213(99)80017-2 · Cited by 679
The nature of feedback: How different types of peer feedback affect writing performance
Nelson, M. M., & Schunn, C. D. (2009) · Instructional Science · doi:10.1007/s11251-008-9053-x · Cited by 602
Metadata
- Venue
- Routledge eBooks
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2013-08-21
- OpenAlex
- W2972003036
- Cited by
- 789
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 10.88
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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