The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Science
Abstract
Social constructionists maintain that we invent the properties of the world rather than discover them. Is reality constructed by our own activity? Do we collectively invent the world rather than discover it?André Kukla presents a comprehensive discussion of the philosophical issues that arise out of this debate, analysing the various strengths and weaknesses of a range of constructivist arguments and arguing that current philosophical objections to constructivism are inconclusive. However, Kukla offers and develops new objections to constructivism, distinguishing between the social causes of scientific beliefs and the view that all ascertainable facts are constructed.
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Citations
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Self-citation
Cited by
Cvitanovic, C., Hobday, A. J., van Kerkhoff, L., Wilson, S. K., Dobbs, K., & Marshall, N. A. (2015) · Ocean & Coastal Management · doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2015.05.002 · Cited by 504
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Popa, F., Guillermin, M., & Dedeurwaerdere, T. (2015) · Futures · doi:10.1016/j.futures.2014.02.002 · Cited by 434
Food waste management innovations in the foodservice industry
Martin-Rios, C., Demen-Meier, C., Gössling, S., & Cornuz, C. (2018) · Waste Management · doi:10.1016/j.wasman.2018.07.033 · Cited by 386
Social Constructivism—Jerome Bruner
Rannikmäe, M., Holbrook, J., & Soobard, R. (2020) · Springer Texts in Education · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-43620-9_18 · Cited by 105
Metadata
- Authors
- Kukla, A.
- Venue
- Routledge eBooks
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2013-01-11
- OpenAlex
- W1524314410
- Cited by
- 532
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 59.67
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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