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Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective

· 2013 · Women, Science, and Technology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 0 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 9 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Abstract

Academic and activist feminist inquiry has repeatedly tried to come to terms with the question of what we might mean by the curious and inescapable term "objectivity."We have used a lot of toxic ink and trees processed into paper decrying what they have meant and how it hurts us.The imagined "they" constitute a kind of invisible conspiracy of masculinist scientists and philosophers replete with grants and laboratories.The imagined "we" are the embodied others, who are not allowed not to have a body, a finite point of view, and so an inevitably disqualifying and polluting bias in any discussion of consequence outside our own little circles, where a "mass"-subscription journal might reach a few thousand readers composed mostly of science haters.At least, I confess to these paranoid fantasies and academic resentments lurking underneath some convoluted reflections in print under my name in the feminist literature in the history and philosophy of science.We, the feminists in the debates about science and technology, are the Reagan era's "special-interest groups" in the rarified realm of epistemology, where traditionally what can count as knowledge is policed by philosophers codifying cognitive canon law.Of course, a special-interest group is, by Reaganoid definition, any collective historical subject that dares to resist the stripped-down atomism of Star Wars, hypermarket, postmodern, media-simulated citizenship.Max Headroom doesn't have a body; therefore, he alone sees everything in the great communicator's empire of the Global Network.No wonder Max gets to have a naive sense of humor and a kind of happily regressive, preoedipal sexuality, a sexuality that

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

Donna Haraway argues that feminist objectivity should be reconceived as "situated knowledges"—embodied, partial, locatable perspectives—rather than either the "god trick" of disembodied universal vision or the relativism that mirrors it. She extends this to argue that the objects of scientific knowledge should be treated as active agents ("material-semiotic actors") rather than passive resources.

Key findings

  • Feminist objectivity "means quite simply situated knowledges": only partial perspective promises objective vision, while the "god trick" of seeing everything from nowhere is an illusion that denies responsibility and accountability.
  • Relativism and totalization are "perfect mirror twin[s]" in the ideologies of objectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective, and both make it impossible to see well.
  • Standpoints of the subjugated are "preferred" because they promise more adequate, sustained, objective accounts, but they are "not 'innocent' positions" and are not exempt from critical reexamination, decoding, and deconstruction.
  • The object of knowledge should be pictured "as an actor and agent, not as a screen or a ground or a resource"; Haraway proposes the "apparatus of bodily production" and the "material-semiotic actor" as terms for bodies as generative nodes whose boundaries materialize in social interaction.
  • She cites reconstructions in primatology as an allegory: the biological female in current accounts "has almost no passive properties left," with difference theorized as situational rather than intrinsic "at every level from gene to foraging pattern."

Methods

  • Theoretical/philosophical essay, not an empirical study; it originated as a commentary on Sandra Harding's *The Science Question in Feminism* at the Western Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association, San Francisco, March 1987.
  • The argument proceeds through conceptual critique and metaphor (vision as the central metaphor), engaging social constructionism, feminist empiricism, Marxist standpoint theory, and postmodernism.
  • No data, sample, or statistical analysis is reported; the paper works through textual and philosophical argument, with primatology and the National Geographic Society's centennial volume used as illustrative cases.

Limitations

  • Not stated in the paper: the essay does not present an explicit limitations section.
  • Evident from the text: it is a conceptual essay with no empirical data or systematic analysis, so its claims are not tested against evidence; Haraway herself notes the difficulty that "how to see from below is a problem requiring at least as much skill with bodies and language... as the 'highest' technoscientific visualizations," and that "there is no single feminist standpoint because our maps require too many dimensions for that metaphor to ground our visions."

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.4324/9780203427415-40

Cites

0 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 1 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 Valid · 0 Not valid · 9 Not checked · 127 Own results and interpretations

  • Probably not a substantial claim. 132
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 34
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 2

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Citations

Cites

  • suggest themselves when the parallels are drawn.

    (n.d.)

    Unresolved

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Metadata

Venue
Women, Science, and Technology
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2013-09-11
Pages
489-506
OpenAlex
W3116284887
Cited by
64
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 2
FWCI
10.52
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Feminist Theory and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Gender Studies › Gender and Feminist Studies
Keywords
situated knowledge, objectivity, feminist epistemology, science and technology studies, epistemic privilege, embodiment, feminist critique of science, epistemology

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4324/9780203427415-40
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Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective. (2013). Women, Science, and Technology. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203427415-40

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.