Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 169

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Sometimes Necessary, Never Sufficient: False-Belief Understanding and Social Competence

·2004·Individual Differences in Theory of Mind

Abstract

In this chapter I address the question of whether a theory of mind, in particular false-belief understanding, is needed for socially competent interaction. First, I discuss theory of mind and social functioning, and consider the paradoxical relation between children’s everyday behavior and their laboratory task performance. Second, I review research literature addressing the issue of relations between false-belief understanding and social competence. Third, I present findings pertinent to this issue from research conducted by my collaborators and myself. Fourth and finally, I attempt to resolve the paradox in light of the research findings.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.4324/9780203488508-6

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cited by

See all 169

Metadata

Venue
Individual Differences in Theory of Mind
Published
2004-03-01
Pages
24-49
OpenAlex
W2554730433
Cited by
169
References
0
FWCI
11.84
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Sometimes Necessary, Never Sufficient: False-Belief Understanding and Social Competence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.4324/9780203488508-6
The paper
Sometimes Necessary, Never Sufficient: False-Belief Understanding and Social Competence. (2004). Individual Differences in Theory of Mind. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203488508-6

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.