Modeling how false beliefs spread
Open accessAbstract
Effective political decision-making requires actors to have accurate beliefs about the domain in which they are acting. But false beliefs about matters of fact are widespread. Such false beliefs are often explained by appeal to individual epistemic factors, such as personal reasoning biases. But these individual factors are only part of the story, as most of what we know, or believe, we have learned directly from other people. Recently, philosophers have begun to use formal methods, including mathematical models and computer simulations, to explore various aspects of social epistemology. This chapter will review the recent literature in the formal social epistemology of false belief. We introduce background work in social epistemology, explain how researchers use models to inform the science of false belief, and discuss what these models tell us about how politically or economically motivated actors shape public belief by exploiting social factors.
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Highly connected individuals possess outsized influence, and it is unlikely that their centrality is solely related to being a producer of higher-quality information.
“Highly connected individuals possess outsized influence, and it is unlikely that their centrality is solely related to being a producer of higher-quality information”
From Stewardship of global collective behavior (2021) · cites this paper as [86]
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References 25 · Cited by 10
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Golub, B., & Jackson, M. O. (2012). How homophily affects the speed of learning and best-response dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3), 1287-1338.
- Michaels, David. 2008. Doubt Is Their Product: How Industry's Assault on Science Threatens Your Health . 1 edition. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weatherall, J. O., O'Connor, C., & Bruner, J. (2018). "How to Beat Science and Influence People: Policymakers and Propaganda in Epistemic Networks". British Journal for Philosophy of Science. DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axy062 · DOI
- Zollman, K. J. (2007). The communication structure of epistemic communities. Philosophy of science, 74(5), 574-587.
- Authors
- O’Connor, C., & Weatherall, J. O.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Irvine (US)
- Venue
- The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2021-03-19
- Pages
- 203-213
- OpenAlex
- W3081714397
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 25
- Citations by year
- 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 17.53
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Educational Strategies and Epistemologies
- Keywords
- false belief, social epistemology, belief formation, computer simulation, political decision-making, reasoning biases, public beliefs, misinformation
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