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Cited by 296Literary and Philosophical StudiesDigitalization, Law, and RegulationArtificial Intelligence in Law

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Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences

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Solum, Lawrence B.·2020·Machine Ethics and Robot Ethics
DOI 10.4324/9781003074991-37
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Abstract

Could an artificial intelligence (AI) become a legal person? As of today, this question is only theoretical. First, putting the AI debate in a concrete legal context acts as a pragmatic Occam’s razor. Second, and more controversially, the people can view the legal system as a repository of knowledge—a formal accumulation of practical judgments. Is artificial intelligence possible? The debate over this question has its roots at the very beginning of modern thought about the nature of the human mind. The classical discussion of the idea of legal personhood is found in John Chipman Gray’s The Nature and Sources of the Law . The responsibility objection focuses on the capability of an AI to fulfill its responsibilities and duties. In considering the various objections to constitutional personhood for an AI, the people have been making the assumption that the AI could pass a strong version of the Turing Test.

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Metadata

Authors
Solum, L. B.
Affiliations
University of Virginia (US)
Corresponding author
Solum, Lawrence B.
ORCID
Solum, Lawrence B.
Venue
Machine Ethics and Robot Ethics
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2020-09-10
Pages
415-471
DOI
10.4324/9781003074991-37
OpenAlex
W315586105
Cited by
296
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 31 · 2020: 35
FWCI
261.57
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • University of North Carolina School of Law Scholarship Repository (University of North Carolina Hospitals) (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Law › Literary and Philosophical Studies
  • Social Sciences › Law › Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
  • Social Sciences › Law › Artificial Intelligence in Law
Keywords
artificial intelligence, legal personality, Turing test, AI rights

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