Language, Levels of Consciousness, and the Development of Intentional Action
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Abstract
In this chapter, the author argues instead that the genesis of action actually does consist in language, because labeling an experience is a precondition for the control of behavior by a conscious representation. He argues that in addition to the initial, constitutive function, language plays an executive function in the development of action control. In terms of the levels of consciousness model, the new level of action control is explained by the acquisition of a higher level of consciousness, referred to as reflective consciousness. Language has long been believed to play an important role in consciousness. Recursion allows the contents of minimal consciousness to be related to a semantic description and interpreted in terms of the description. This description can then be decoupled from the perception described, and maintained in working memory. Intentionality is thus a ground-level characteristic of consciousness, which aims beyond itself at an object, much in the same way that intentional actions aim at something.
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Cited by
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Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M., Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., Philipp, A. M., & Koch, I. (2010) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0019842 · Cited by 1,485
The dynamics of embodiment: A field theory of infant perseverative reaching
Thelen, E., Schöner, G., Scheier, C., & Smith, L. B. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01003910 · Cited by 1,066
Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine
Merker, B. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000891 · Cited by 868
Executive function and theory of mind: Stability and prediction from ages 2 to 3.
Carlson, S. M., Mandell, D. J., & Williams, L. (2004) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/0012-1649.40.6.1105 · Cited by 684
Development of theory of mind and executive control
Perner, J., & Lang, B. (1999) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01362-5 · Cited by 657
Metadata
- Authors
- Zelazo, P. D.
- Venue
- Developing Theories of Intention
- Publisher
- Psychology Press
- Published
- 2023-05-12
- Pages
- 95-118
- OpenAlex
- W3005988302
- Cited by
- 67
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.13
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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